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Dedication
For my grandparents, who instilled in me from a young age that an education was a way out of the
struggle. To my entire family, who supported me on my path to a higher education. To all the
people in this world hustling to improve the lives of those unfortunate enough to promote positive
change on their own. To artists, such as Immortal Technique, who have shown that there is more to
the world than the whitewashed narrative being portrayed by those who engineer popular culture.
And most importantly, to all the dead others of the past who never had a chance to tell their side of
the story, as well as all the voiceless others who are currently still being subjugated, marginalized,
and forgotten: it will not be much longer. Until then, I leave to you the words of my grandfather:
Siempre para adelante.

Epigraph
My destiny is to show the world that the [struggle] is real. Go back in time and play this [music] for
the slaves in the field and for my children in the future, waiting to breathe. People slowly dying
hanging on, waiting to leave. Believe when I'm gone, and this album's on a library shelf, I'll be one
with God and one with you and everything else… Revolutionary Volume 2 has been brought to
you by the type of [people] who ain't scared of [anything]. And if you playing this album, and I'm
no longer here, and sometime far away from when I recorded this, remember that history isn't the
way the corporate controlled media made it look like. Read between the lines and free your mind,
revolution is the birth of equality and the antithesis to oppression. But this is only built for real
[people]. So when I'm gone, don't let nobody I never got along with try to make songs kissing my
ass, recycling my beats or my vocals. The [struggle] is real over here man. Thank you for listening,
and thank you for supporting independent Hip-Hop, the heart and soul of our culture keeping the
truth alive. Goodnight my people. Goodnight… - Immortal Technique
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Abstract
I use Edith Wyschogrod’s figure of the heterological historian to argue that we have a
responsibility to learn from the “dead others” of the past in order to better apply in practical ways
the lessons we learn from history. I draw on an interpretation of Nietzsche’s view on
historiography to examine the claims of Hegel’s dialectic, namely, that the Ideal Absolute for
which Spirit pines, is actually achievable, particularly through the advent of the Internet.
Beginning with a relatively well-known interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of history,
Fukuyama’s, I show how Hegel’s dialectic takes shape in Fukuyama’s interpretation as a negative
aspect of Spirit’s unveiling. This “negative aspect” results in Spirit being stuck in a perpetual
feedback loop from which only the conscious realization of its current state, and a cognizant effort
by the future subjects of history to free it, will in fact do so. Consequently, this thesis serves as the
basis for rejecting Fukuyama’s claim that history came to an end with the fall of communism, and,
as such, the task of engaging in the dialectical work of Spirit in order to continue to work towards
its final “Ideal” form is incomplete and calls for further philosophical and ethical work. I show
how this active acknowledgement, the “conscious realization”, and concerted, “cognizant effort”
to bring about the necessary change needed for Spirit to carry on its journey is a fundamental part
of Spirit’s ongoing unveiling of the parousia that we, humans, are intimately a part of. It is an
unveiling that is made manifest by the heterological historian’s implementation of socially
conscientious art and technology.
Additionally, I further argue that this parousia can only be completed by way of active,
practical engagement, and that phenomenology, in practice, can lead one to this realization.
Furthermore, I argue that once one understands the conditions entailed by these claims and begins
to engage in the practices they involve, one has a moral obligation to not only the dead others but
vii

to all future others to help them do the same. The practices involve addressing the voices of the
dead others as victims of the dominant agents acting irresponsibly to achieve their own
self-interest at the expense of the interests of excludes, or “dead” others. In order to do so, I make
the claim that this is a moral prerequisite for all individuals who have satisfied the basic tenets of
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. More specifically, I argue that the conditions for which the others
can elevate themselves to the upper echelons of Maslow’s hierarchy must first exist before
indulging in the exploits afforded by Western liberalism, a condition which is not afforded to us by
Fukuyama’s interpretation of Hegel’s dialectic.
In doing so, I hope to show why I believe Wyschogrod is correct in stating three arguments
for better taking into account the lost possibilities of the “dead others” and the potential
possibilities of “future others”, the first of which is that the inherent contradiction in Hegel’s
dialectic leaves out certain people and cultures from history. The second is Wyschogrod’s claim
that a new ethics, an ethics of understanding, is needed to manifest Spirit in a more conducive
manner than war. Lastly, I hope to show that Wyschogrod is correct in stating that history, as we
know it, is coming to an end via technology, and that it is the moral obligation of the heterological
historian to help it do so.
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Chapter 1: The Get Out of The Ghetto Blues
1.1

Kill The Poor
There is a specter haunting Western liberalism, and that specter is future oriented

community that calls for a new ethical imperative that thinks of communities in a new manner; a
manner which takes into account an adequate emphasis on the plight of what Edith Wyschogrod
refers to as the dead others. There is a reason for my borrowing and modifying these famous lines
from The Communist Manifesto, and the reason is in response to Francis Fukuyama’s work The
End of History? Specifically, I find it is important to be critical of the fundamental philosophical
commitments of Fukuyama views, which are identified through a Hegelian critique of Marxism.
Following the logical mandates of Hegel’s dialectic, Fukuyama’s view holds that history has
synthesized as capitalism’s victory over communism and its related forms of government. Given
the neo-liberal agenda however, things do not look good for those who have been subjugated by
the mandates of capitalism, which is why it is important to be critical of Fukuyama’s
preemptiveness through a Wyschogrodian lens. In turn, this approach requires that I borrow
various literary tools from Wyschogrod in hopes of remaining faithful to her philosophical
enquiry. Furthermore, for my thesis, it is important to affirm that the Communist Manifesto is still
informing the perspective of the voiceless dead others through the work of Wyschogrod’s
heterological historian as a means of offering an antithesis to Fukuyama’s claim. As such, I am
aware of the fact that informing my writing in such a manner also reflects an influence of the
Communist Manifesto’s style, for there is still work to be done and a battle to be fought for the
subjugated dead others.

1

1.2

I Hate it When They Tell us How Far We Came to Be, as if Our People’s History
Started With Slavery
Located in the southwestern desert of the United States on the border with Mexico, lies the

once sleepy city of El Paso, Texas. Until recently, El Paso’s fame consisted of very few incidents
that brought it front and center to the American oculus at various points in history: the 1966 men’s
national college basketball championship win by the then Texas Western Miners,1 being the
hometown of Felina, the Mexican maiden who’s love proved to be the downfall of Marty
Robbins’s scorned outlaw in the song El Paso, but most recently, a cutaway segment in Family
Guy.2
In this segment, after being informed of having to stay in El Paso for two days, the show’s
lead character, Peter Griffin, despondently asks “What are we going to do for two days in El
Paso?” His friend, Glen Quagmire, responds by stating “There’s a Chicano heritage festival.”, to
which their third friend, Joe Swanson, immediately and firmly responds “No way”. Eventually,
Quagmire proceeds to suggest they visit the Pershing House, where John Pershing took control of
the 8th Army brigade in 1914. After exchanging quixotic looks, the scene cuts away once more to
the trio inside what appears to be Pershing’s bedroom, in which an enchanted Peter joyously
names off various items that once belonged to Pershing; namely his bed, his floor, and his lamp.
As harsh as this satire may seem, until recently, it was an unfortunately relatively accurate
observation of a city that, despite historical significance and a wide ranging Mexican culture, had
nothing to offer on a national scale. Being the second largest border city in America, El Paso is the
size of, and in some instances larger than, various major cities located within the United States.
Yet, despite outnumbering the city of Atlanta, Georgia, by over four-hundred thousand people, El

1
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Paso has no major sports franchises to speak of. And although El Paso outnumbers Las Vegas,
Nevada, by over two-hundred thousand citizens, El Paso has no major entertainment districts to
boast. Furthermore, despite outnumbering Lake George, New York by a whopping 800,000
people, El Paso has no major amusement parks to speak for.
In terms of entertainment, it is not hard to see why El Paso makes for such an easy punch
line. And yet, despite its many perceived shortcomings, El Paso is a rapidly expanding community
that, unlike most American cities enmeshed in the national downfall resulting from The Great
Recession, is experiencing a robust growth spurt. Depending on whose version of relatively
contemporary history you accept, the growth spurt is due to one of two reasons. The first view
holds that the rapid growth that has “recession proofed” El Paso is due in part to the massive
allocation of government resources that has invested millions of dollars into the local economy and
infrastructure to accommodate the massive influx of military personnel and their families.
According to this view, one of the major beneficiaries of this redistribution of wealth has been the
local El Paso workforce, of which ten percent is employed by the Army’s local installation, Fort
Bliss.3
Despite the questionable significance of an economy that relies so heavily on such a
massive military presence, the competing view about why the El Paso economy is growing, and
appears to be booming, is outwardly grimmer. This latter view holds that El Paso’s economy
improved correlative to the mass exodus of Mexican citizens seeking refuge in response to the
violence and bloodshed that once made El Paso’s sister city, Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, the most
dangerous city in the world. Supporters of this view recognize that both El Paso and Ciudad Juarez
are inexorably joined at the hip and it is not merely because these sister-cities are only separated by
a two-minute walk across an international bridge. Their being joined at the hip more adequately
3
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and economically refers to the way that the former historically reaps benefits off exploiting the
latter.4 On this view, not only has the money that has traversed the border served to stimulate the
local economy, it has also invested in it by way of various bars and restaurants that have brought a
rambunctious nightlife to a once quite city. Yet, this one way transfer of business has done more
than just shift the economic interest from one side of the border to the other; it has managed to do
so while quarantining the violence in Juarez, which in 2010 averaged nearly ten murders a day.
Comparatively, in 2010 El Paso was ranked the third safest city in America with a population over
500,000 people.

5

There is plenty of anecdotal evidence to attest to the factors surrounding El Paso’s recent
growth, but the numbers give us some hard evidence to galvanize such claims. According to
Nin-Hai Tseng,6 within the last twenty-five years alone, the individual earning power in El Paso
grew 147%, with 2% coming during the initial years of The Great Recession, 2008 and 2009,
respectively. What these numbers mean is that, while much of the rest of the U.S. was declining,
El Paso was able to achieve the largest per capita income growth among the nation’s one hundred
largest metropolitan areas.7
Despite its relatively optimistic appearance, there is an underlying reality about the
booming El Paso economy that is not so rosy. That is, regardless of where the stimulus is coming
from, if we follow the money trail from those who have great wealth to those who do not, we
discover a great deal of suffering. Whether it be the suffering of the Wise family, who lost two of
their three sons in Afghanistan,8 an Afghani teenager known only as Abdulhai who flatly states
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that the he hopes war will end soon and that people will live and share humanity together,9 or a
Mexican family of eight that was murdered over a $125 debt,10 these and many other numerous
examples of suffering can be said to be interconnected with the economic growth in El Paso. A
growth that, dubious as it may be, is unfortunately as welcome to the southwest desert land as a
drought breaking rain.
As reported by Tseng, despite the massive growth spurt El Paso is experiencing, it is still
ranked 99th overall in the United States with a per capita income slightly under $29,000. The
reason the surge looks so impressive, according to Tseng, is only because “El Paso… is starting
from a much lower base than most cities.”11 Although Tseng’s analyses is relegated to a brief
sentence in the concluding remarks of her article, and as such results in only passive interest to
most readers, this insight is worthy of its own article. Perhaps, as a native El Pasoan, a manifest
critique would be that I am biased in claiming that the once economically sub-par conditions of El
Paso need to be further studied; naturally, what is to be expected of someone other than to be
concerned for the community from which they were spawned? For my thesis, a scholar like Tseng
sheds the light of hard evidence on the economic plight of the traditionally immigrant and
historically poor Mexican community, adding to the vocalization of what has become known in
popular culture as “the struggle” experienced by most El Pasoans. This is a struggle that I identify
with, and as a result, am admittedly empathetic towards others who are dealt a similar role.
Although Tseng may not realize it, yet alone have intended it, in using her position to give
credence to an easily overlooked injustice, she was giving a voice to countless number of past
individuals who, in their voicelessness, never had the ability to make their struggle known, let
alone capitalize off the hypothetical awareness that would bring about the physical change
9

We do not want war
Benedetti, Ana
11
Tseng, Nin-Hai
10

5

necessary to end it.
For the majority of its existence, El Paso has consisted of a community of predominantly
underutilized, underemployed, and all around underrepresented Mexican immigrant population
that has formed the foundation of the city. Regardless of their origination in Mexico, and
undoubtedly other south-American countries as well, the Diaspora of Mexicans that concentrated
in El Paso, until recently, found itself on the losing end of Western liberalism. Having very little
money, no land, no owned homes, no voice, no grasp of the English language, or primary
education (let alone degrees) to speak of, many of the original inhabitants of El Paso found
themselves forced to labor just to get buy. Moreover, most were only given seasonal work that
required strenuous physical exertion for minimal pay, only to be forced back to their homeland
when the job was finished. For the lucky few who, either legally or illegally, were able to stick
around in America, the prospects were not much better, for although they were in the land of
opportunity, few had the above mentioned tools necessary to buy into the American dream.
In time, however, those who managed to work their way up from Mexico to the United
State were able to establish themselves as productive members of society. Arriving here with
almost nothing, most of these individuals were able to establish families and homes, a trend that,
with each passing generation, was able to further afford the opportunities inherent in Western
liberalism. As time further progressed, these families who were once so dependent on manual
labor for survival were finally able to begin affording the remarkably priced state sponsored higher
education provided by the local university, a trend that only further served to advance the local
population by allowing them to buy into the mandates of Western liberalism that prefers
“educated” individuals in its professional workforce. No longer relegated to the realm of physical
work, the children of those who originally labored to build the homes that fostered the sprouting of
6

“professionals” were able to begin securing jobs that provided not just the means of survival, but
leisure and expendable income as well.
Synchronically, it would appear as though the steady foundation afforded by the original
laborers served to ground the pedestal built by the professional workers who, in turn have given
their children the opportunity to seize the benefits of a rapidly expanding El Paso economy. If it
was not for this trend, I most likely would have never had the possibility of writing a master’s
thesis, and as a result, I can attest to being the beneficiary of such a support structure. Having not
only grown up in an economically depressed neighborhood of an already economically depressed
city, I believe it is fair to say that I have an insider’s perspective on the happenings of growing up
in El Paso as part of a marginalized group.
Furthermore, having lived outside of El Paso for various periods, particularly during both
the military expansion phase and Juarez massacres, I can also attest to having the outsider’s
perspective of watching the city erupt from a humble desert town to a bustling town. For almost six
years, I, like most young El Pasoans, left searching to find “something to do”. This came as a
response to eighteen years of being frustrated with the realization that, in a city that once lacked the
entertainment outlets currently available, there really was nothing to do in El Paso. In returning,
however, I find that that is now no longer so much the case. While El Paso still lacks the major
attractions enjoyed by smaller cities, their appears to be something perhaps more important
sweeping through the dessert town; an artistic renaissance of sorts.
Until very recently, outside of the summer season, which provided the opening of the local
water and amusement park and a couple of small scale festivals, the options for entertainment were
generally limited. Aside from typical outlets, such as movies and bars, there was no real channel
for creative expression. Although a few bands managed to escape El Paso and eventually make it
7

big, there was no real music scene, no art or entertainment district, and few sports outlets to rally
around. In 2014, however, it is not uncommon for there to be multiple musical shows on any night
of the week, to take in an art exhibit at either the local museum or various other outlets that cater to
local artists, to dine at locally owned mobile and traditional restaurants, or to enjoy the festivities at
any one of El Paso’s three entertainment districts. Furthermore, at a time when El Paso hosts not
one, but two major yearly music festivals, it is not uncommon to bump shoulders with musicians,
DJ’s, and all around artists in general.
Granted, while it is perhaps preemptive to state that this artistic awakening is in anyway
related to the economic upturn experienced by the city, one still must ask the basic question: what
happen? In a community that has been steadily increasing in population since the mid-19th century,
did all it really take for it to experience its largest cultural revolution is a hefty government contract
and a massacre? While the most recent incarnations of both certainly serve as “positive” examples
for such a claim, given the history of El Paso, there seems to be more to the puzzle than just an
enhanced government presence and massacres. After all, El Paso has maintained a military
presence throughout the majority of its history, and massacres in Ciudad Juarez are nothing new.12
Furthermore, given its proximity to the border, there has also always been a wealthy slew of
Mexican nationals maintaining residents in El Paso who invested in the local economy throughout
various points in history. There seems then to be an added condition, atop of the two previously
mentioned, that serves to explain the shift towards artistic expression in the borderland southwest.
1.3

Some People Think I Won’t Make It, But I Know That I Will, You Can Make The
Future, But it Starts With Leaving The Past
In A Theory of Human Motivation, Abraham Maslow attempts to define a series of

12
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propositions that enable him to establish a “definitive” theory of human motivation, and thus,
perhaps help us discover what that “something else” is.13 Amongst these propositions were that:

1. The integrated wholeness of the organism must be one of the foundation stones of
motivation theory.
3. Such a theory should stress and center itself upon ultimate or basic goals rather than
partial or superficial ones, upon ends rather than means to these ends.
4. There are usually available various cultural paths to the same goal. Therefore
conscious, specific, local-cultural desires are not as fundamental in motivation theory as
the more basic, unconscious goals.
7. Human needs arrange themselves in hierarchies of pre-potency. That is to say, the
appearance of one need usually rests on the prior satisfaction of another, more pre-potent
need. Man is a perpetually wanting animal.
11. The situation or the field in which the organism reacts must be taken into account but
the field alone can rarely serve as an exclusive explanation for behavior.

In response to these mandates, Maslow introduced what has become known as his
Hierarchy of Needs, which define the various conditions he believes must be met before an
individual can achieve higher levels of self-actualization. For Maslow, this hierarchy consists of
five different levels, the first four of which Maslow believes account for the “deficiency needs” in
humans. In these first four levels, Maslow believes humans satisfy their primal desire for various
needs which help build the foundation for an individual who will ideally one day be able to
capitalize on the “growth need” of the fifth level by becoming as self-actualized as possible.
13
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In the first level, Maslow believes individuals must satiate fundamental physiological
needs, such as breathing, having food and water, and sleep, to name a few. Maslow notes that these
needs are the most pre-potent of all, and that without being able to satisfy them, one’s motivation
for them will surely outweigh their motivation for any other desire.14 Maslow states that, in a state
of hunger-seeking-satisfaction, other possibilities, such as the urge to write poetry or take interest
in American history fall by the wayside, with the sole intent being hunger-satisfaction.15
Furthermore, Maslow contends that
Another peculiar characteristic of the human organism when it is dominated by a certain
need is that the whole philosophy of the future tends also to change. For our chronically
and extremely hungry man, Utopia can be defined very simply as a place where there is
plenty of food. He tends to think that, if only he is guaranteed food for the rest of his
life, he will be perfectly happy and will never want anything more. Life itself tends to be
defined in terms of eating. Anything else will be defined as unimportant. Freedom, love,
community feeling, respect, philosophy, may all be waved aside as fripperies which are
useless since they fail to fill the stomach. Such a man may fairly be said to live by bread
alone.
Maslow proceeds to offer the remaining levels of his hierarchy, the first of which being
safety, which ensures the security of things such as the body, employment, morality, and the
family. The next level, love and belonging, is fulfilled once an individual has established
friendship, family, and sexual intimacy. Having satisfied this level, Maslow believes the
individual may progress to the esteem level, which ensures self-esteem, confidence, achievement,

14
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and respect by and for others.16 Once the deficiency needs have been satisfied, an individual may
progress to address the growth need, which, as the self-actualization level, fosters morality,
creativity, spontaneity, problem solving, lack of prejudice, and acceptance of facts.17
As dictated by Erik Erickson’s epigenetic principle, however, progress through each stage
is in part determined by [one’s] success, or lack of success, in all previous stages.18 That is, as
noted by Maslow above, if one stage is left unsatisfied, advancement to a further stage will be
nothing more than an afterthought. Therefore, in returning to El Paso, we find that while some of
the basic tenets of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs were clearly present in early El Paso incarnations,
various other mandates, to varying degrees, were left unmet. As stated before, having started from
the bottom rung of Western liberalism’s ladder, most early El Pasoans were charged with the task
of satisfying the fundamental tenets of Maslow’s hierarchy.
In mandates of Western liberalism, such as income, cost of living, and education, it is fair
to say that the early wave of El Paso immigrants who had no education, and thus were limited to
“unskilled” low paying jobs, were forced to allocate what little money they did receive for various
survival necessities, such as shelter from the elements, food, water, and security. As a result, the
prospect of advancing past deficiency needs was relegated to nothing more than an afterthought.
After all, how is one supposed to partake in the humanities when they need money to feed, shelter,
and clothe themselves? Clearly, if one has not labored enough to protect themselves from the
elements, how is one supposed to contemplate the vast mysteries of the universe? Without a firm
foundation on which to fall back on, most creative ventures are desires at best. Once one is no
longer concerned with their physiological health, safety, belonging, or esteem, however, the
16
17
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possibilities for self-actualization begin to unfurl before an individual’s eyes.
It would appear, then, that once the basic tenets of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs were met
that enabled El Pasoans to not only protect themselves from the environment and manufacture
enough goods to sustain their survival, there appeared to be a generation lying in wait to reap the
fruit of past generation’s labor. No longer forced to labor for subsistence, the current generation of
El Pasoans is able to capitalize on the economic growth the city is currently experiencing, and thus
serving as a driving factor in its growth by supporting the local community. Their contribution,
however, is no longer limited simply to their spending power, as now more and more El Pasoans
are able to contribute their own personal works of art into the mix. And while the classic archetype
of the starving artist is every bit alive and well throughout the El Paso artistic community, it
definitely eases the brunt of not having the sustainable income associated with most artistic
ventures if you have a solid support structure to fall back on. Whether it is mom or dad, cousin or
friend, grandmother or grandfather is irrelevant; the fact remains that that with the economic
upswing experienced in El Paso within the past quarter century, more and more individuals have
been given the privilege of inserting themselves into a world that is only available because it was
built by previous generations.
1.4

The Poverty of Philosophy
Despite the fact that, on a national scale, El Paso is still playing catch-up, the current

economic and cultural boom is all an example of what is possible with Western liberalism, given
the right conditions. Having had the “fortune” of having two significant events unfurl in its vicinity
simultaneously, as well as a young population ready to embrace change, El Paso was able to
capitalize on an opportunity and bring about the evolution it desperately needed. But what if El
Paso was Anytown U.S.A. that was not located next to such an infamous city, or had the benefit of
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ecological conditions conducive to military operations? That is, what if El Paso was not in its
unique position of being situated within a mountainous desert climate that mimics the environment
of the location of the current war in Afghanistan, or located next to a city that was at one point as
dangerous as the most infamous cities of all time? And what is to be made of those who are not
living in a city experiencing an economic upswing as El Paso currently is? What if El Paso was
another Detroit, Michigan, and once the factories shut down, it was left in the wake of destruction?
Given the ephemeral nature of history’s progression through time, it is certainly not impossible to
imagine a post-massacre, post major-government-headquarter El Paso where such a scenario is in
fact the case. In fact, commentators, such as Tseng, have already predicted this very scenario.19
The question then becomes, what can El Paso offer when such a time comes? Given that there is
still no major industry for which to speak of, is El Paso’s fate consigned to reverting back to its
pre-military expansion, pre-massacre stage, or worse? Or, having satisfied the basic tenets of
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, will El Paso be able to embrace new forms of production and move
forth on its road of upward mobility?
These are all question that remain to be answered. At this point, however, what is for
certain is that El Paso’s economic boom would most likely not have been possible without Western
liberalism. To the extent the suffering induced by military operations and drug trafficking inspired
massacres as a manifestation of Western liberalism in El Paso then, becomes the question.
Furthermore, without a population that was comfortably situated on the upper echelons of
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, there would not have been a population able to partake in the
“positive” effects of the current El Paso renaissance. It would appear, then, as though, prima facie,
perhaps a certain level of suffering unavoidable, and certainly inherent in order for El Paso to
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experience an economic revolution.
Given the nature of Western liberalism, it is easy to focus on the positive manifestations
that have unfolded in El Paso due to its economic growth. But what is to be made of the suffering at
the end of the money trail? Although data undoubtedly exists to document the struggle faced by
those who died in response to military operations and drug related massacres, are they to be
ignored from the mainstream narrative for not fitting in with the traditional narrative of success
inherent in Western liberalism? Furthermore, would promoting awareness of the others plight
celebrate their suffering? A suffering that, if left untold, however, may ultimately be for not? More
importantly, is it possible to redeem the suffering of individual others, such as Ben and Jeremy
Wise, by telling their narrative?
All of these and then some are questions posed by Edith Wyschogrod’s heterological
historian, a concept I will be employing phenomenologically in an attempt to arrive at the answer
to these and other questions. In doing so, I will directly challenge Fukuyama’s claim that history is
over, and that Western liberalism, in its current incarnation, is the victorious form of governance
that can no longer be expanded upon. In order to do so, I will bring to light various inconsistencies
in Fukuyama’s narrative in an attempt to put forth the claim that, although Western liberalism is in
fact the most ideal form of governance, it could serve to adopt a more community oriented
perspective that renders the suffering of those who have not satisfied the lower levels of Maslow’s
hierarchy of needs moot, a task that is grounded in Kant’s Principle of Humanity. This will be done
by demonstrating why the heterological historian is morally obligated to insert themselves into the
world through action and art, both of which will be shown to be manifestations of the updated
views of production essential to Wyschogrod’s notion of community. In order to do so, the
heterological historian will employ the manifestation of their contribution to the information
14

culture with the intent of shedding light on the plight of the voiceless others, as well as taking into
account the plight experienced by past and future “others” who were not and possibly will not be
able to.
In doing so, I will ultimately argue that, contrary to Fukuyama’s view, the process of
empowering individuals to insert themselves into the world through art and action intended
towards establishing a future oriented community predicated of hope and promise simply amounts
to another manifestation of Hegel’s Spirit; a step towards its ultimate quest for the Absolute.
Specifically, I will argue that humanity is currently in the process of a historical epoch that is
coming to be via a technological unveiling of Spirit. In doing so, I will advance the claim that,
much as the Battle of Jena and the resulting principles from the French Revolution were
quintessential components of Western liberalism’s formation, the creation of the Internet is the end
of our historical age, with the ensuing events serving to establish a true universal homogenous
state. I will show that this process is ultimately a parousia that helps bring us to the realization that
we are all in fact a community founded on humanity, an understanding made possible by the
connectivity afforded by the Internet by way of the information culture. In consummation, I will
argue that the empathetic connections created by witnessing the plight of the others through the
work of the heterological historian will conclusively fulfill the promise for the future by
empowering those who were once rendered voiceless to engage in a Nietzschean revolution by
challenging the historical narrative of victory that has traditionally served to propagate solely the
“victor’s narrative”, and thus offer an antithesis to the dominating account of history’s unveiling.
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Chapter 2: The Revolution Will Not be Televised
2.1

Started From The Bottom Now We’re Here?

Although it is a commonly held belief that the United States of America is the land of
opportunity, recent research clearly indicates otherwise. In Harder for Americans to Rise From
Lower Rungs,20 Jason DeParle illustrates by way of various articles the stark reality that, in terms
of upward mobility, America is far behind its Canadian and most Eastern European counterparts.
Specifically, DeParle offers scathing critiques of the level of upward mobility enjoyed by
American, such as Republican Congressman and former vice-presidential candidate Paul D.
Ryan’s belief that “mobility from the very bottom up is where the United States lags behind.”21, or
the Brookings Institution’s Isabel V. Sawhill’s claim that “It’s become conventional wisdom that
the U.S. does not have as much upward mobility as most other advanced countries.”22, in order to
convey his concern towards the lack of economic mobility afforded to most Americans.
Particularly, DeParle focuses on a study conducted by Markus Jantti,23 which discovered
that 65% of Americans raised in the bottom fifth income bracket tend to stay there as adults, while
62% of Americans who were raised in the top fifth income bracket manage to stay in at least the
top two brackets as adults. DeParle notes that while the fluidity of mobility in the middle classes
tend to stay relatively consistent, it is in the upper and lower classes that are of biggest concern. In
DeParle’s words, “affluent families transmit their advantages, and poor families stay strapped.”24
Although DeParle’s article proceeds to measure the differences in opinion between liberal and
conservative accounts, the underlying theme, as summated by Scott Winship, also of the
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Brookings Institution, remains constant; “Poor Americans have to work their way up from a lower
floor.”25
Clearly this is not the case for everyone, as the opportunity to improve one’s economic
condition still exists.26 For my thesis, however, the concern is not for the conditions of those
individuals who do manage to climb the ladder of upward mobility, but rather for those who are
stranded on the lower rungs, whether they are American or not. This concern is predicated off my
reading of Fukuyama’s The End of History?, which claims issues, such as economic inequality,
have already been resolved in America. In order to first understand the historiographical context of
Fukuyama’s position, and the ramifications of his argument, however, it is important to first
understand the Hegelian framework and the ensuing historical milieu from which he is operating.
2.2

Past is Dead
For Hegel, there are three modes in which historiographers engage in to achieve their goals

of fathoming Sprit’s unveiling, the first of which being an attempt to decipher what he refers to as
original history. In this view, we receive accounts of actions that were actually witnessed by the
historian. As such, traditional means of recording history, such as legends, folk songs, and
traditions are excluded, for they are recorded from obscure modes of memory.27 Hegel notes that
the goal of this type of history was to internalize the external world, and was interested in people
who knew what they were and what they wanted. For Hegel, this type of history is merely a portrait
of time, and it cannot offer a true reflection, as the modern reader was not a part of the Spirit of the
time in which it was recorded. Hegel notes that statesmen, naïve monks, and people of high social
standing are generally the recorders of this type of history.
Conversely, reflective history is defined in terms of current historians recollecting the past.
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To that extent, there are four sub-categories, all of which Wyschogrod notes are a non-reflexive
and naïve naturalistic way for people to accept things as they are told. The first of form of reflexive
history is universal history, which aims to give a history of individuals and the world. Hegel notes
that not only is the Spirit once again not the same in each instance, but that the historian
instantiates the Spirit of his own culture upon their accounts, thus biasing the entire analyses. The
next form is the pragmatic universal, and it is driven by a theory or ideology. Its aim is to bring the
past into the present, a task which is solely dependent on the mind of the historian. Hegel notes that
each culture faces decisions that can only be made in that particular era and that, referring to the
ancients is inconsequential, as one reflective history supersedes another. Furthermore, much like
universal reflective history, Hegel feels as though the historian is imposing their Spirit on the Spirit
of that time. The third form of reflective history is critical, his least favored in the sense that it is
simply a history of history. In attempting to differentiate fact from fiction, it is simply passing off
subjective views as reality. The last form of reflective history Hegel offers us is specialized, which
focuses on a specific field, as well as forms the transition to the final form of history Hegel offers
us, the philosophic. In this form, Hegel gives us further insight into his view of Reason and Spirit,
and demonstrates how they affect his views on philosophy. Specifically, Hegel feels as though
philosophy influences thoughts and events, and as such, past events can be understood according
to thoughts, which Hegel feels are a priori.28 Specifically, thoughts first occur in the realm of
consciousness, and it is only later that they are manifested in the material realm in the form of
actions. Wyschogrod notes that this last view of history is one in which the historian is elevated
into a position of timeless topography.
2.3

Holes in Our Spirit Causing Tears and Fears, One Sided Stories For Years And
Years
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In briefly analyzing Hegel’s views on historiography, we are further introduced to a key
philosophical component that drives his dialectic, Spirit. For Hegel, as well as for my thesis, it is
important to note that the essential feature of Spirit is its pursuit of actualized Absolute freedom.
For Hegel, history is the unfolding of Spirit, what I am calling a parousia in the sense of a
self-creating process that makes of itself what it will become. History, for Hegel, is “a vast
spectacle of events and actions in restless succession”,29 the work of reason expressed as optics, as
Wyschogrod states. Hegel believes that it is our responsibility to fathom the cunning of reason in
hopes of achieving the end goal of Spirit, the Absolute. Per Hegel, however, The Absolute is only
achieved through a “slaughter bench” of history, in which Spirit manifests itself in dubious
manners, such as war.
In order to accomplish this actualization, it is a fundamental feature of Spirit that it remain
in motion, or, as Hegel states, be in “constant negation of all that threatens to destroy freedom.”30
To that extent, Hegel feels as though the embodiment of Spirit’s self-realization in history is the
nation, and that the nation’s progress towards freedom is measured by its actual level of freedom,
which, according to Wyschogrod, is defined as the pursuit of the rational ends intrinsic to the life
of Spirit.31
For Hegel, the beginning of Spirit’s quest to manifest as Absolute freedom also marks the
beginning of history, a move which is set into motion by the ancient Orients32 and their
acknowledgement that the despot was free. Unfortunately, Hegel felt as though Chinese moral
laws were compulsory rights and duties, and that what was missing was the element of freedom.33
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For Hegel, the people of the ancient Orient were not aware of the fact that they were free because
they did not know of Spirit. Since it is the essential aspect of Spirit to be free, and the Orients were
oblivious to it, Hegel deduces that they in fact were not free. Instead, Hegel refers to the ancient
Orient’s belief that only one person was free as “mere arbitrariness, savagery, stupefied
passion…”34 and that this one free person was not in fact so, and was merely a despot feigning
freedom.
Continuing from this point, Hegel moves to the ancient Greeks and Romans, noting that it
was through them that the consciousness of freedom first arose. As such, Hegel believed that the
ancient Greeks and Romans were free. However, Hegel notes that both these cultures only
believed certain individuals were free, and as such, states that “their freedom itself was partly a
matter of mere chance…”35
For Hegel, it was only through Christianity and the Germanic people that the awareness of
the fact that it was a core tenet of human essence to be free came to be, simply by virtue of being
human. Despite this fact, Hegel notes that the awareness of this freedom alone was not the end of
the journey, noting that regardless of this acknowledgement, hindrances, such as slavery, still
existed. That being the case, if the ancient Orients were the germ of the plant, then the Germanic
state would be the tree that eventually gave rise to the eventual fruits of absolute freedom
According to Wyschogrod, the unveiling of Spirit as history is “a spectacle of ephemera
which arise, endure for an interval, decay, and give rise to new forms.”36 This process leads to the
development of the notion of time that witnesses the rise and fall of various peoples and
civilizations. This process is an evanescent spectacle of birth, death, and rebirth, one which Jules
Simon referred to as a dazzling display under the gaze of the rational subject. Wyschogrod
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believes that the documenting of this spectacle was made possible through the manifestation of the
parousia that gave Hegel’s backward glance of history concrete objects in the form of images,
which solidified its existence. Wyschogrod claims that “Hegel’s history is an ocular display
brought under rational control, with Spirit the subject, creator, viewer, and object of this
display.”37 This stream of past events, for Wyschogrod, is a history of achievements that unfurls
less as a discursive record, and more as a dazzling spectacle.
Wyschogrod affirms, however, that under the precept of Hegel’s rationalization, Spirit
itself cannot transcend its essence as the content of an image; the Spirit of an image, as it were. It
also cannot remain in a fixed position in history, surveying as a panopticon of Spirit’s unveiling,
for to do so would be to simply stand idly by, a contradiction for that which is, by nature,
constantly unfolding. As intent as Hegel is to establish the end of Spirit at The Battle of Jena,
Wyschogrod notes that it is crucially important to examine the time that proceeded it, for although
the founding principle of Western liberalism may have been established in 1806, it is evident in
2014 that history continued after that.
Furthermore, operating under a Hegelian lens, it is crucial to understood that it is in Spirit’s
nature to constantly be in negation of all that threatens to destroy freedom, and the only way this
can manifest is when consciousness of true freedom is made evident, an event that is triggered by
a lack of external coercion.38 Wyschogrod-reading-Hegel affirms that true freedom is not freedom
from all restraint, for this expresses itself in terms of violence. Rather, true freedom is the rational
expression of the subjective will through the universal will.
A critical feature of Hegel’s views on Spirit’s unveiling, however, is the belief that history
“is out of the question” for entire continents of people, such as those living in sub-Saharan
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Africa.39 As Wyschogrod contends, however, this view of history marginalizes entire groups of
people and civilizations, delegating them to the chance of two things, the first of which being their
geographic location. Wyschogrod notes that, for Hegel, only those living in temperate
environments with access to the sea are included in the throes of history, while those who are not
have been marginalized. The second of these chance occurrences would be a culture’s subjective
disposition. As Wyschogrod demonstrates, individuals whose society has been deemed primitive
by Hegel, cultures marked by such things as simple technology, agrarian and herding economies,
and social organizations established via custom rather than law,40 also are not included in the
unfolding of Spirit. If that is the case, Wyschogrod asks, what ontological status are those left out
of history, and ipso facto Spirit, afforded?41
This is a problem for Hegel, who, as previously mentioned, felt as though the conclusion of
Spirit, and thus history, came to fruition in 18th century Europe. Clearly this gives rise to an
unavoidable contradiction in Hegel’s dialectic, for if Spirit’s quest is the Absolute, what is to be
made of people and cultures that are both Spirit and not-Spirit at the same time? Furthermore,
Wyschogrod asks, by not relegating these people and cultures to the realm of the real, does that not
then make them hyperreal?42 And if that is the case, would not these types of individuals and
cultures be getting their countenance from that which they are tokens of, namely primitive objects?
Furthermore, by consigning these individuals and cultures to the realm of hyper reality, is Hegel
not admitting that there exists something outside of the Absolute? Wyschogrod believes so, noting
that what these individuals and cultures represent is an alterity, or otherness, that does not conform
to the process of Spirit unfolding. That being the case, these marginalized people and cultures do in
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fact play a larger role in Hegel’s dialectic than originally imagined, namely that of negation, which
would call the entire notion of Hegel’s Spirit into question. Specifically, Wyschogrod’s thesis is in
direct contradiction to Hegel’s historiographical views, for how history could have started, yet
alone have come to an end, if not all people and cultures have been taken into account?
2.4

I Follow The Moskva, Down to Gorky Park, Listening to The Wind of Change
Despite this glaring contradiction, many still seem willing to embrace Hegel’s dialectic and

historiography as a means of justifying the exploits inherent in a victor’s narrative. Specifically, in
The End of History?, Fukuyama asserts that, in light of relatively recent historical events, Western
ideology has prevailed over competing theories. Chiefly, Fukuyama asserts that the fall of the
Berlin Wall is the completion of the Hegelian dialectic, signaling a victory for Western liberalism
over the competing theories that arose in the East, namely Marxism and its offshoots. Fukuyama
notes that this victory is evidenced by the total exhaustion of systematic alternatives to Western
liberalism, and made evidence not by the political evolution of the world’s two largest communist
countries, China and Russia, but by their desire to engage in the free-market economics of Western
culture.
Because of this, Fukuyama believes that we are witnessing not only the end of a post-war
era in particular, but the end of history in general. Fukuyama notes that the complete end will not
occur until the evolution has manifested itself in both the world of consciousness and the material
world but, for all practical purposes, there is simply no further evolution that human ideology can
make that will lead to anything better than, or even expand upon, Western liberal democracy. As
such, Fukuyama believes Western liberalism is settled as the final form of human government.
Fukuyama states that the idea of an end to history is not an original one, noting that it was
present in both Marx’s and Hegel’s dialectic, with the former simply being an inversion of the
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latter. Fukuyama, reading Kojeve, notes that for Hegel, the establishment of the founding
principles behind the French Revolution are settled as the founding principles of Western
liberalism. From this, Fukuyama’s reading of Kojeve claims that the vanguard of humanity shifted
with the introduction of the idea of the “imminent universalization of the state incorporating the
principles of liberty and equality.”43 As such, Fukuyama’s reading of Hegel remains faithful to
Hegel’s belief that the Battle of Jena marked the end of history, because, despite the fact that there
were things “outside” of Spirit, the “basic principles of the liberal democratic state” could no
longer be improved upon.44 Fukuyama notes that the state that emerges at the end of history is
liberal for only as long as it both recognizes and protects the human universal right to freedom
through a system of laws, and remains democratic only insofar as it exists through the consent of
the governed. Fukuyama’s reading of Kojeve notes that this actualized state is known as the
universal homogenous state.45
Fukuyama proceeds to declare that human history is based on contradictions that arose
from various factors, such as primitive man’s desire for recognition, the master-slave dialectic, a
desire for mastery of nature, the struggle for a universal recognition of rights, and the relationship
between the proletariat and the capitalist. Fukuyama’s reading of Kojeve claims, however, that in
the universal homogenized state, all conflicts have been resolved, and there is no longer an issue in
regards to “large” problems.46 As such, Fukuyama believes that the only thing left to be made
sense of is economic activity.
In regards to the contradictions that drive history, Fukuyama claims that they exist
primarily in the realm of human consciousness, and as such, that Hegel’s simplified view is that all
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human behavior, and thus history, originates in the realm of consciousness. Fukuyama posits that
the realm of consciousness affects the material realm as ideas are what initially give birth to
actions. Fukuyama argues that, despite the fact that other countries may be slow in adopting the
principles of liberalism, it is only a matter of time before the overwhelming thought process
manifests itself amongst the subjects of the nations which have yet to accept Western liberalism in
the material world. Fukuyama claims how this is most readily seen in the example of the Burmese
officer who, upon being sent to the Philippines for medical treatment, allegedly was reduced to
tears in coming to realize how far behind his socialist nation had fallen to a liberalized one, as well
as that of top Russian officials who admittedly paid only lip service to the founding mantras of
Marxism and Stalinism.47
Because of this, Fukuyama essentially arrives at the conclusion that, with the fall of
communism and all of its politically affiliated ideologies, Western liberalism was clearly the
winner in the game of global chess. Fukuyama affirms that this is no more evident than in Asia,
where the demand for access to consumer culture has fostered a welcoming society ready to
promote the perceived positive aspects of economic and political liberalism. Fukuyama notes that,
in true Hegelian form, the former is following the latter and that universal acceptance of Western
liberalism, however slow it may be, is inevitable. Continuing on his claim, Fukuyama proceeds to
highlight the political evolution and recent historical exploits in order to trace the slow rejection of
Marxism-Leninism in what Fukuyama believes is the golden child of Western liberalism’s
success; manifesting itself in the largest and oldest Asian cultures of them all, China.
2.5

Rage Against The Machine
In light of Fukuyama’s analyses, it should be evident that as far as general retellings of

history are concerned, both he and Hegel simply appear to be remaining faithful to the tradition of
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propagating de-facto principles established by those who managed to ride the tide of history into a
position of power. That is, as was Hegel’s observation, there seems to be an inherent truth to the
fact that group thought manifests itself in the physical world through conquering, whether it be the
physical conquering of a people that results in the seizing of a land, the ideological conquering that
results in the supplanting of traditional customs and beliefs, or both. Furthermore, if the ideology
that managed to thrust itself into a position of power is to remain intact, ideally it would continue
the same thought process that afforded such a position in the first place by ensuring that the
thoughts circling about the realm of consciousness that originally drove it also remain intact. It
would appear, then, that choosing to dictate the course of history, how it is told, what is told, what
light it is told in, and who is ultimately included, is simply the spoils of war, as it were.
For Hegel, of course, the majority of this is predicated off chance. Furthermore, if one is
afforded a position of power that grants them the ability to dictate the course of history, and how it
is recorded, it is in their best interest, and in the best interest of the others as well, as per cultural
hegemony, to allow the power structure which has supposedly manifested itself in the most ideal
form of governance to continue controlling the narrative. The problem with this, of course, is that
the possibility exists that those in control of the narrative will be motivated to ensure that the little
fort of privilege they have ensconced themselves in remains in power.
This view is best defined by Nietzsche’s inversion of the master/slave dialectic, which
holds that the actual genesis of the concept “good” does not stem from those to whom “goodness”
is rendered.48 Rather, Nietzsche believes
it [is] the “good” themselves, that is the noble, powerful, higher-ranking, and highminded who felt and ranked themselves and their doings as good, which is to say, as of
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first rank, in contrast to everything base, low-minded, common, and vulgar.49
Given their position of power, Nietzsche believes “they” have taken it upon themselves the right to
create values, regardless of their utility. In that respect, that same logic can easily be extended to
the information, or as in cases such as propaganda, misinformation, that is distributed to rally
individuals around any given cause. In contemporary society, this is most readily seen in states
such as North Korea, where the party members not only transport “laborers” to makeshift “cities”
in Russia where they are told they are actually still in North Korea, but also provide citizens with
state-sponsored media that encourages them to remain in school so they can learn how to defeat
their “American adversary”.50
In terms of history, this simultaneously blatant and subliminal form of information control
has had wide-ranging success. One need look no further than the extreme prejudice exercised by
the Catholic church’s controlling of the sole source of supposed information in an attempt to
maintain the power structure they had amassed; from John Wycliffe, who forty-four years after his
death, was victim of Pope Martin V’s despicable demand to have his remains exhumed in order
that they be crushed and thrown into a river in retaliation for translating the Bible from Latin to
English51 and beyond. As has been shown by history, however, this sort of control only remains
viable for as long as the information that leads to alternative thought processes is kept under
control. Given historical accounts, it would appear as though there was nothing more destructive to
the monopoly of the Church than both the advent of the printing press and the translation of the
Bible into the vernacular. In other words, those who managed to manipulate Spirit in such a way
that afforded them a position of power seemed, either by lack of technology that threatened to
break their stranglehold on information or a concerted willingness to preserve the status quo, to
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enjoy the benefits of maintaining the sole source of supposed information, and appeared willing to
continue this monopoly with no qualms whatsoever. Once the information was made readily
available to the others, however, it did not take long before the commonly held belief that the
Church should control the sole source of supposed information was called into question, thus
allowing for change to begin manifesting in the realm of consciousness.
What resulted, of course, is a subject of history that could take up a thesis of its own. For
our intents and purposes, it is important simply to note that, once the crack in the dam allowed for
the voices of the repressed to seep through, it was only a matter of time before they burst through
the wall of censorship imposed on them by the domineering narrative. Simply put, even though it
is in the best interest of those in power to build walls to try to remain in a position of power, to do
so is only a futile attempt at pacifying a restless Spirit.
Ideally, then, the goal would be to provide a way in which the voices of the others could be
gathered in such a way that would enable them to formulate the thoughts necessary to manifest the
change needed in the realm of consciousness to begin breaking these walls down. As Nietzsche
notes, the only way the master/slave dialectic, and thus the relation the others have to the authors
of the narrative, will end its perpetual continuity is that a revolution be undertaken in hopes of
bringing it to an end.52 It cannot, however, be a physical revolution, for in undertaking any form of
violent action, the slave class will simply be propagating the values of the elite. Instead, Nietzsche
advocates a different approach that would require the undertaking of a “spiritual” revolution in
hopes of re-evaluating the values one deeply holds. Nietzsche notes that:
Of all that has been done on Earth against “the noble”, “the mighty”, “the lords”, “the
power-holders”, nothing is worthy of mention in comparison with that which the Jews
have done against them: the Jews, that priestly people who in the end were able to obtain
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satisfaction from their enemies and conquerors through a radical reevaluation of their
values, that is, through an act of spiritual revenge.53
Nietzsche observes that the spiritual revolution undertaken by the Jews was in direct
response to the aristocratic equation of values, which held that anything that was good was noble,
and anything that was noble was powerful, and that which was powerful was also beautiful, and if
it was beautiful it was happy, and thus loved by God. Nietzsche notes that the Jews dared to invert
this equation, driven by an unfathomable hate driven by powerlessness, and established the view
that “the miserable alone are the good; the poor, the powerless, lowly alone are the good; the
suffering, deprived, sick, ugly are also the only pious, the blessed in God”.54 Nietzsche proceeds
to claim that the noble, powerful, cruel and insatiable godless ones are cursed, doomed, and living
in perpetual hell.
Nietzsche argues that this revolt in morality is only undertaken once ressentiment becomes
creative and gives birth to new values.55 Nietzsche claims that it is irrational to assume, let alone to
expect, that power express itself in any other way than power, and for weakness to do so in any
other way than weakness. Despite this inherent truth, however, Nietzsche believes “that the strong
one is free to be weak, and the bird of prey to be a lamb”, and as such, they (the lambs) thereby gain
for themselves the right to hold the bird of prey accountable for being a bird of prey.56
In order to convey this belief, Nietzsche offers the example of the battle between Rome and
the Jews, with Rome playing the role of the powerful and the Jews that of “priestly ressentiment
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par excellence.”57 In regards to the actual “battle” itself and who emerged victorious, Nietzsche
simply asks which of the two bows before the other. And Judea did not simply stop there,
according to Nietzsche, as it continued to use ressentiment as a means of transforming the lives of
those far beyond the initial borders of Jewish influence, both in regards to spirituality and in thirst
for a dramatic reevaluation of values. This is best characterized by the events of the French
Revolution, an event of which Nietzsche posits led to great jubilation and to the manifestation of
the belief that the “privilege of the few” was now the “privilege of the majority.”
2.6

Take The Power Back
As dictated by both Nietzsche and Hegel, it would appear as though the catalyst for change

would ideally be a new credo predicated off non-violence that must first form in the realm of
consciousness. However long it takes to manifest is irrelevant. All that matters is, once this
understanding is in effect, it is only a matter of time before it externalizes in the material realm.
The question is, how is such a thought to enter the collective consciousness if it has yet to be
properly formulated?
Enter Wyschogrod and her version of the heterological historian, who is driven by the eros
for the dead and the urgency of ethics, and who speaks from out of the cataclysm that [they] cannot
name.58 Riding the wave of technology at her disposal, Wyschogrod intends to provide the
framework from which the heterological historian, operating within the information culture, can
function when attempting to uncover the past. In doing so, Wyschogrod not only empowers her
heterological historian with the archaeological toolkit necessary to fill the void left by “the entry of
nihil into time”59 but also gives a voice to the dead others who were unfortunately relegated to the
fringes of history. In other words, Wyschogrod’s heterological historian offers one of the first
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phenomenological tools necessary to survey the entire scope of history subjectively, through the
lens of technology, in hopes of bringing to the gaze of rational subjects a number of various
injustices that have both prohibited the telling of alternate forms of history and perpetuated the
manipulation of those fortunate enough to control the historical narrative. In doing so,
Wyschogrod has established the foundation necessary for an ethics of remembering and
understanding to begin taking shape as an ideological principle.
Although it may seem a daunting task to attempt to establish a system of beliefs powerful
enough to manifest a conscious revolution, Wyschogrod notes that the heterological historian has
at their disposal a vast array of references that were previously unavailable to professional
historians. Moreover, Wyschogrod notes that the professional historian may even be left out of this
“culture of images” produced by an increased availability of photographs, films, television, and
museum exhibits, to name a few, which have contributed to what Wyschogrod posits is a
fundamental epistemic transformation and cultural upheaval that has revolutionized not only the
way information is distributed but, as we shall see, the way ideas are spread as well.
As a result, unlike Kant who, as an idealist, hopes to direct us towards a teleological aim60
or Hegel, who claimed such a progression had already manifested itself through a dialectic
process, Wyschogrod makes us aware that, because of the acceleration and increased availability
of such technology, it is impossible to reduce meaning to any particular historical event, for the
phenomenon of a historical event means the event itself is constantly being divided into
innumerable signs. That is, given the infinite amount of subjective perspectives, there are no hard
and fast meanings to any historical event.
The question for Wyschogrod then becomes, in response to Hegel’s concern of the
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historian instantiating the spirit of their respective culture on the culture of the others, how is the
heterological historian to “speak the language of their time so that she may be understood… from
within the cataclysm that cannot be pictured?”61 Moving away from isolated incidents,
Wyschogrod posits that in this new culture of images, large scale phenomena involving sizeable
sums of people necessarily move past the written word and into an ocular realm where the events
are ensnared in both still and moving images. Thus, Wyschogrod believes a new language is
necessary to account for this advancement that would allow the heterological historian to
“dis-figure [an] artifact, this photograph… that has been con-figured by the age of images so as to
re-figure it within the non-space of ethics.”62 In doing so, the heterological historian would be able
to point out the context dependent character of the past using contemporary language, and thus
avoid imposing their own phenomenological perspective on the event in question.
Wyschogrod proceeds to note how, just as the heterological historian stations themselves
within the cataclysm, so too does the culture of images create observations that cannot be
overlooked. Wyschogrod claims that the historian is not simply a conduit for information, but
rather an “eyewitness” that inserts themselves into events and “carries forward the work of naming
and speaking in the name of the dead others.”63 Wyschogrod believes that, for the heterological
historian, this is best accomplished through photography because, at its core, it is essentially a
manufactured phenomenological tool that has enabled any given individual to concretize their
respective experience by “taking notes” of everything in the world from every possible angle.
Through photography, we find Spirit unveiling itself through a self-revealing act of
parousia, one which allows that which will never again be repeated, to be eternalized in the form of
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“the absolute particular”. Unlike times which proceeded the universalization of camera-ready
devices, the historian is now able to have physical proof of events as perceived through the eyes
and lenses of those who were not fortunate enough to write from the perspective of the victor’s
narrative. Because of this, Wyschogrod notes that the historian no longer names, describes, or
analyzes an object; rather, the object names itself.
This act of a self-establishing unveiling serves as the foundation for the galvanization of
narratives that allow the heterological historian to solidify the claim that, where the camera once
stood, an event was as such; a phenomenological manipulation of tools that allows the
heterological historian to capture a punctiform moment of space and time to affirm one’s
subjective experience.64 Wyschogrod, citing Barthes, notes that these photographs serve as
political and cultural statements, as well as artifacts that are subject to critique. Furthermore, this
phenomenon emanates entirely from within the content of the picture itself, further substantiating
the importance of establishing the narrative of events. Most importantly, this gives the ability to
speak for oneself, a privilege that was taken away from the dead others.
As a result, Wyschogrod believes the real power of an image emanates from its ability to
“destabilize” the viewer by wounding them with the most glaring element of an image that stands
out the most. Wyschogrod notes that, due to the epistemic differences inherent in the
phenomenological experience, different interpretations of this punctum will arise. What remains
universal, however, is the fact that images delineate what is both visible and invisible, what was
and what could have been. Most importantly is the fact that images remove any boundaries of
localizability; that is, no longer are people simply “over there”. They are now also in my living
room, computer, or palm in El Paso, Texas, despite the fact that they may be physically located on
64

Following a Benjaminian line of reasoning, the importance of the preponderance of camera-ready devices,
particularly amongst those who initially could not afford them, should not be underestimated

33

the other side of the world.
2.7

Without a Face
While the role thus defined by Wyschogrod amounts to an undoubtedly important task for

the heterological historian, there remains a gaping hole that needs to filled, namely that of the role
played by the others that are not yet dead. For if giving voice through images to those who were
rendered voiceless by events of the past is praiseworthy, certainly giving voice to those who are
still capable of being saved from future tragedies is even greater. Which is why it is important to
expand Wyschogrod’s original definition of the others to include those currently on the fringe in
hopes of extending her theory in order to give voice to all victims that have been rendered
voiceless, not just those that are dead and, in doing so, fulfilling Wyschogrod’s desires of
establishing and maintaining an institution such that people who were once voiceless will no
longer be.
Much like Wyschogrod’s original formulation of the heterological historian, this new
historian uses any means available to them, whether it be to write, photograph, film, televise,
and/or archive as a means to fulfill their promise to the dead others to tell the truth of the conditions
which prevent them from satisfying even the basic levels of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Instead
of being consigned to playing the role of Kierkegaard’s Knight of Infinite Faith, who, wish though
he may, will never taste the sweetness of the princess’s love, our future-oriented heterological
historian will see the “necrophilia for the past”65 re-imagined as a reciprocated mutual relationship
of vivacity that will seek with sick passion to give birth to a future where the plight of the others is
nothing more than a dark chapter in human history, filed next to The Crusades and The Holocaust;
one which future subjects of history look back to with disgust and disdain as they wonder to
themselves, “how did our ancestors ever allow such a thing to happen?” The concerted effort by
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the heterological historians, who will one day themselves be subjects of history, to give voice to
the others is a crucial element in this expanded view of Wyschogrod’s heterological historian, lest
we fall victim to Nietzsche’s belief that an excess of history serves to neuter the individual’s
motivation for action.
That said, maintaining Wyschogrod’s understanding of the heterological historian is of
utmost importance, as it undoubtedly serves as the basis for my expansion. Without the
groundwork that she laid, it would be impossible to arrive at my conclusion. I am simply hoping to
expand on Wyschogrod’s initial definition to better accommodate the potential plight of all the
others, in hopes of establishing a precautionary principle that demands individuals act in such a
way that would prevent a future cataclysm.66 Ideally, this modification will simultaneously allow
the historian to traverse space and time and be concerned with not only the dead others of an
irrevocable past, but the current and future subjects of history as well, who hope to avoid the state
of nihil imposed on them by both the Cataclysm and the cowardly. Future subjects who, unlike
Wyschogrod’s spurned historian, are able to not only reciprocate the love of the brave who chose
to stand by their side, but perpetuate it as well.
2.8

The Military Industry Got it Poppin’ and Lockin’ Looking For a Way to Justify he
Wolfowitz Doctrine
As far as the heterological historian is concerned, not only has history not come to an end,

there is still plenty of work that needs to be done before the idea that is necessary to manifest
constructive change can even enter the realm of consciousness, let alone the material realm. Of
course, maintaining this view requires the adamant rejection of Fukuyama’s assertion that history
ever came to an end, an arbitrary claim that wreaks of cultural hegemony. More specifically, if
Fukuyama is correct, and Western liberalism really has won, then the marginalization of the others
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will not only be allowed to continue, but essentially be accepted.
Given Fukuyama’s credentials, one would be hard pressed to argue against his
understanding of the political and economic tide that swept across the world in recent history;
thankfully, there is no need to question his understanding of either landscape. I do not seek to enter
into a line by line deconstruction of The End of History; rather than concern myself with
Fukuyama’s theme at a technical level. I am interested in the philosophical kernel of his argument,
for it is on a meta level where Fukuyama’s stance seems to have its deepest flaws, which are
summated as follows: True to Nietzsche’s master-slave dialectic, Fukuyama, in attempting to
defend Western liberalism, attests to the side of “liberalism” that only a privileged few are privy to
enjoy.
This is most evident in response to his question of whether there are any contradictions left
that cannot be resolved by Western liberalism and that would be resolved by “an alternate
political-economic structure”,67 Fukuyama, in continuation of his above mentioned claim that
“The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident by the total exhaustion of viable
systematic alternative to Western liberalism”68 claims that his concern is “not to answer
exhaustively the challenges to liberalism promoted by every crackpot messiah around the world,
but only those that are embodied in important social or political forces and movements, and which
are therefore part of world history (emphasis mine).”69
In other words, in true Hegelian form, Fukuyama is concerned solely with those individuals
who were fortunate enough to satisfy Hegel’s absurd conditions for qualification into the
unfolding of Spirit. Thus, in the dismissive nature typical of any victor’s narrative, Fukuyama
proceeds to briskly cast off the plight of the others in one fell swoop, relegating them to the realm
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of inconsequentiality solely for their lack of presence on the same scale as those “larger” and more
“developed” states of the world “who after all account for the greater part of world politics.”70
In attempting to establish “consumer culture” as the hallmark for Spirit’s Absolute,
Fukuyama proceeds to use the word “liberalism” in a very liberal manner; as if being able to buy a
VCR is truly an indicator of freedom. By choosing to focus solely on the financial aspects of
Western liberalism, not only is Fukuyama speaking to/from the fortunate side of something that is
radically disproportionate across the “Westernized liberal world”, income, he is completely
ignoring the basic tenets that Western liberalism is supposed to propagate; freedom, equality,
brotherhood, life liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. When seen less subjectively, it is clear that
Fukuyama’s “Western liberalism” is nothing more than a euphemism for neo-liberalism. In other
words, all the self-evident beauties entitled to the individual simply by fortune of birth, not by
fortune of location of birth, as both Hegel and Fukuyama mistakenly believe, are not as important
as all of the gadgets they can have if they can afford to buy into Fukuyama’s version of Western
liberalism.
This so called victory that Fukuyama proclaims on behalf of Western liberalism is
prima facie at best; when seen from the inverted perspective of the others, it is quite clear that
Fukuyama is interested only in how “diverse contents”, such as color televisions and rock music,
have infiltrated the “peasant’s markets.”71 This itemization essentially amounts to a written
account of The Kitchen Debate, and in no way should this superficial notion of success imply that
Spirit has manifested itself in its final form of government. When Fukuyama speaks of the
exhaustion of competing theories, he himself is being extremely liberal to the promise
neo-liberalism, has shown. For one, while the basic tenets of freedom and things of the like may
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initially be present, when the interest of power comes into play, history tells us that those in control
would not hesitate to restrict said freedoms in order to maintain rule. Granted, to Fukuyama’s
credit, he does offer the caveat that
The state that emerges at the end of history is liberal insofar as it recognizes and protects
through a system of law man’s universal right to freedom, and democratic insofar as it
exists only with the consent of the governed.72
As has been seen in the early part of 21st century, however, the increase in heightened security in
response to possible “terrorist threats” has resulted in the drastic reconfiguration of American civil
liberties. Given that, it would appear as though there is in fact room for expansion in Western
liberalism, namely that which restricts the ability to restrict Spirit’s basic tenet, freedom, contrary
to Fukuyama’s initial claim.
It must then be taken into account that, as per Hegel, as long as there is a hindrance to
Spirit, it will constantly be seeking to destroy these impediments through constant negation, and
thus never be completely actualized. One need look no further than the events that illustrated the
Occupy Wall Street movement in recent years to see this fact manifest in the physical realm.
Despite the lack of opportunity for upward mobility faced by most citizens of the United States,
the majority of Americans are clearly still on the winning side of the victor’s narrative in regards to
the technological goods Fukuyama trumpets as the hallmarks of Western liberalism’s victory. The
underlying concern, then, is that it takes more than a smart phone and rock music to instill a sense
of justice. Given that, by claiming that the ability to buy into the luxuries afforded by Western
liberalism is sufficient to proclaim victory against any competing theories, Fukuyama is clearly
perpetuating the above mentioned critique of attempting to perpetuate the power structure that has
enabled the so called victor to remain in control.
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In doing so, however, Fukuyama is falling victim to the majority Hegel’s historiographical
concerns. For one, given Fukuyama’s social standing, particularly at the time of writing The End of
History?,73 it would be naïve to say he does not fit Hegel’s description of an original historian.
Furthermore, in attempting to establish the historical significance of the fall of the Berlin Wall on a
global level, Fukuyama makes a sweeping assumption about the state of current affairs faced by
various citizens of different countries, and as such, falls victim to reflexive universal historicizing.
In addition, given the fact that Fukuyama is motivated by his neo-liberal agenda, he also falls
victim to reflexive pragmatic universal historicizing. Moreover, having been made aware of the
negation the others play to Hegel’s dialectic, and the fact that Fukuyama not only makes no
attempt to include them into his end of history, but goes so far as to explicitly state that they are of
no concern to him, Fukuyama is simply passing a subjective fictional account of reality that is not
based in facts, and as a result, falls victim to Hegel’s least favored form of historicizing, reflexive
critical historiography.
Most importantly, however, is the fact that not only is the Spirit of Fukuyama’s neo-liberal
culture hardly relatable to the majority of individuals, but in prematurely proclaiming victory for
his notion of Western liberalism, Fukuyama is instantiating the Spirit of his own culture upon the
accounts of billions of marginalized individuals the world over who do not share in the same spoils
as someone afforded Fukuyama’s position does, thus biasing his entire analyses.
None of Hegel’s historiographical concerns burden the heterological historian, for as has
been shown, rather than speak for the dead others and the others, the heterological historian has at
their disposal the above mentioned framework to manipulate the information culture in such a way
that avoids the instantiation of their Spirit on that of other past and current cultures. In proceeding
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phenomenologically through the non-space of ethics, the heterological historian is free to arrange
themselves in a position where they can take seriously the subjective condition of any and every
theoretical perspective, including Fukuyama’s.
2.9

Born as Ghosts
While the founding ideals established in the Battle of Jena are almost certainly not going

to be advanced, that does not mean that they cannot be manipulated to fit into a better system of
governance. As it stands, Fukuyama is simply molding abstract concepts to suit the needs of his
own personal theory. These ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity, to name a few, however, are
less defined then we would like to think. Rather than instances, they are more like noble principles
that have yet to be properly applied. As such, words like “freedom” and “autonomy” remain
general terms that are yet to be truly defined, for we are still in the process of trying to flush them
out. And this “flushing out”, contrary to the belief that history has come to an end, can only be
done through application.
Therefore, much like Wyschogrod’s earlier critique of Hegel and in response to
Fukuyama’s previously posed question, there does seem to exist a contradiction to Spirit. Aside
from the glaring contradiction posed by those left out of Spirit, we have in 2014 both the potential
as well as the manifest content for a radical reevaluation of the concept of Western liberalism.
With the steady increase of connectivity afforded by technology, it seems intuitive that the
expansion and push towards a more universal community is inevitable, and thus, change to the
system it operates within should be anticipated as well. As a result, we are left with no other option
but to reject Fukuyama’s thesis that, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rise of access to
consumer culture, victory can be proclaimed for his version of Western liberalism.
2.10

We Didn’t Start The Fire
40

To claim that one has been freed from the plight of the others simply because of their
ability to afford material objects is a gross misunderstanding of, or complete ignorance towards,
the statistically sound principle that correlation does not equal causation. This failure can be most
readily seen through the lens of the cameras capturing grainy images of brutal crimes being
committed during cases such as the Syrian Civil War, where footage of an alleged chemical attack
was live streamed on the Internet for the world to see.74
Currently enmeshed in Hegel’s slaughter bench, to say that a Syrian is living a better life
simply because they have access to technology that enables them to live stream the death and
destruction currently enshrouding them is a gross overstatement made from an uninformed
position; a statement that does not so much signal a victory for Western liberalism as it does an
affirmation of aesthetics. Although Fukuyama is wont to claim that the ability to have the
technology in the first place is evidence of one’s desire to partake in Western liberalism, the truth
could more easily be that most people, as evident by Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, are drawn to
nice[r] things. Whether it be material, ideological, or just overall quality of living, why would
anyone be content with substandard conditions when better options are readily available? While it
could be argued that the hypothetical Syrian’s desire for the phone is simply a result of their desire
to film the horrific events they are currently enmeshed in in the hopes of drawing attention to their
plight, in hopes of one day arriving at the Western liberalism Fukuyama triumphs as the end all, I
do not believe that is Fukuyama’s intent.
In Fukuyama’s narrative, there is no such desire for nicer things, as the notion of a class
struggle is an “issue that has actually been successfully resolved in the West.”75 In a convenient
recounting of history, Fukuyama proceeds to offer an apologist take on contemporary society,
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noting that the income inequality that exists in American society is less a result of Western
liberalism and more the byproduct of things such as the thought processes that manifested during
the culmination of the slave era. In other words, for Fukuyama, the fact that minorities, namely
Blacks in this instance, are disproportionately unaccounted for in terms of monetary equality has
nothing to do with his euphemized notion of Western liberalism and everything to do with the
belief structure of those who propagated the legacy of slavery and racism.
Never mind the idea that this view completely discounts the fact that most indigenous
pre-slavery era Africans almost certainly never thought of a world where they would be brutally
ripped away from their homeland, only to be shipped away thousands of miles to a foreign one
where they would eventually be subjugated to some of the most inhumane conditions ever
documented. Fukuyama’s claim blatantly disregards the fact that most people do not have the same
starting point to be able to buy into capitalism, let alone influence policy. If one is fortunate
enough to be born into a position where their basic needs, per Maslow’s hierarchy, are already met,
ideally they already have the opportunity to be educated in this form of governance. Thus, they
naturally have the advantage of manipulating the system in such a way that benefits their desires.
What this amounts to, essentially, is Fukuyama backing away from the argument with his hands
raised so as to say “Hey, do not blame me for the negative drawbacks of the Western liberalism,
that is just the byproduct of ancient ways of thinking that are just now starting to manifest
themselves.”
This reasoning is reminiscent of manipulation tactics employed by English settlers in
British India. In his article Ethnographic Mapping and the Construction of The British Census in
India,76 Kevin Hobson notes that in an attempt to control the indigenous population in British
India, English settlers sought to exploit the religious beliefs of the Indian caste system. Hobson
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notes that while the English originally viewed the caste system as a way for the ruling Brahmin
class to remain in power, it actually existed on a different cosmological framework that sought not
to measure one’s worth by economic ranking, but rather the ability to regenerate on a higher plane
of existence. Once the difference between the traditional English class system and the Indian caste
system was discovered, however, it became easier for the British to manipulate in return for
acquiescence.
For our purpose, we have the domineering narrative telling us that everything is ok; just
keep plugging away in your role as one of the others, and who cares if you do not have as many
opportunities as you would like, charge this new game console to your credit card and keep giving
us money to further perpetuate the income inequality to the point where you will not even be able
to afford the very products you make. If you work hard enough, one day, after you have managed
to pay off your inflated mortgage, car note, and school loans, “Western liberalism” will allow you
the opportunity to join the club of affluent individuals who have managed to come out ahead.
Furthermore, while Fukuyama seems content in offering fragmented examples of how
Western liberalism has positively affected the lives of individuals, he conveniently fails to mention
how it has negatively impacted them as well. For example, in relation to the consumption of goods,
Fukuyama continues the Hegelian tradition of marginalizing Sub-Saharan Africa by opportunely
failing to mention the plights of cultures such as the Congolese, who, dating as far back as the
mid-19th century, have been brutally exploited for the minerals in their country for the sake of
profit.77 In regards to his Asian golden child, China, Fukuyama, through no fault of his own, at the
time of writing The End of History? was unaware of the eventual suicide nets that would
eventually be erected at the Chinese-based company Foxcon, a company that produces
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technological goods through sweatshops.78
If Fukuyama is right, then the fact that workers, some of them children, are made to suffer
is merely the process of Spirit manifesting itself in its ideal version of Western liberalism. Surely
this cannot be the case. Seen through a Hegelian lens analyzing the benefits of “Western
liberalism”, however, it seems as though Fukuyama would be wont to say that incidents such as the
amputation of an innocent Congolese’s arm or the ending of an innocent Chinese person’s life
were necessary sacrifices that had to be made solely to promote the Absolute manifestation of
Spirit as Western liberalism. Clearly this also cannot be the case.
As much as Fukuyama wants to establish the claims that history has come to an end and the
principles of Western liberalism can no longer be expanded upon, there seems to be an excessive
amount of negations left out of the grand scheme that still need to be accounted for. Although it
“matters little what strange thoughts occur to people in Albania or Burkina Faso”79 to Fukuyama,
to the heterological historian, it matters plenty that anti-government protests are being held in
Albania, a democratic nation, in regards to a lack of response to poverty and unemployment,80 or
that aid consultants for a charity that was supposed to provide Burkina Faso, which is also a
democratic country, with clean water were paid £1 million, while the residents received nothing.81
If Fukuyama was truly “interested in what one could in some sense call the common ideological
heritage of mankind”,82 ideally he would understand that Mankind is a universal made up of
individual parts, and that freedom, as dictated by Hegel, is the rational expression of the subjective
will through the universal will. Furthermore, ideally Fukuyama would understand that while it is
convenient for the rent seeking inherent in Western liberalism to simply marginalize the plight of
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the others for the sake of the “greater good”, it is not convenient for those relegated to the annals of
history.
As one sided as Fukuyama wants to make the argument, there is no Law of Excluded
Middle in human affairs; by simply proclaiming victory for Western liberalism without taking into
account the negative ramifications it may have on those not fortunate enough to be part of the
upside of its manifestation, he is leaving out all the gray area that needs to be expanded upon to
take into account those who are in fact left out by his interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of
history. In that regard, Fukuyama is a unmistakably preemptive in stating that all viable systematic
alternatives to Western liberalism have been exhausted, for while Marxism, as a practice, has
consistently failed to be properly applied, as has been shown, the same could be said of
Fukuyama’s Western liberalism, as well.
2.11

April 29, 1992 (Miami)
In Fukuyama’s defense, I completely grant Hegel’s claim that the basic tenets of freedom

were established during the Battle of Jena. After all, it is no coincidence that the principles seeking
universal liberty, equality, and brotherhood were established in response to, and in the aftermath
of, a revolution started by a group of the others who had long been subjected to the whims of the
those in power. What I argue against is Fukuyama’s belief that Hegel’s dialectic concluded during
the latter part of the 20th century. For if this is the case, then Fukuyama is left with the following
dilemma: if the argument that history has come to an end with the establishment of Western
liberalism, which is predicated on the principles of the French Revolution, is to be accepted, then
things like conflict minerals and sweatshops pose a direct negation to this claim. And until the
suffering of all of the others, such as those exposed to dehumanizing conditions for the sole
purpose of manufacturing the consumer goods Fukuyama posits as the hallmark for Western
45

liberalism’s victory, is eradicated, then the claim that Western liberalism can no longer be
expanded upon are baseless, for ideally, some alternative can be devised where sweatshop workers
do not have to be exploited simply to enjoy the pleasures of technology.
Most damning for Fukuyama, however, is that in sermonizing from a unitary perspective
that is far removed from the reality it attempts to manipulate, his account of Western liberalism
modernizes Hegel’s initial contradiction by running afoul of Spirit’s quest for Absolute. That is,
rather than simply negate only individuals who were not fortunate enough to be born in a
temperate environment or subjective disposition, Fukuyama negates any and everyone who is
starting from the lower rungs of Western liberalism.
Specifically, as shown in Harder for Americans to Rise From Lower Rungs, DeParle
demonstrates the problem arises when not everyone is free to partake in Western liberalism at the
same level as those who have more economic liberties are. As DeParle argues, given the depth of
American poverty that leaves poor children starting from especially far behind, compounded with
the premium placed on higher education by American employers and the tendency for children to
follow their parents educational trajectory, having an uneven starting line dictates that people
coming from a background of less schooling are subject to an especially difficult path towards
upward mobility.83
Furthermore, DeParle affirms that since higher educated individuals tend to be higher
earners, an added premium is placed on the ability to come from an educated and affluent
background, as ideally one would have the added bonus of having access to better schooling. To
further convey this urgency of this point, DeParle quotes the president of the Russell Sage
Foundation as saying: “Upper-income families can invest more in their children’s education and
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they may have a better understanding of what it takes to get a good education.”84 For the others
who do not have access to the same starting as their wealthy counterparts, it would appear then that
they will be in a perpetual state of “catch-up”.
Seeing as to how the nature of Spirit is to manifest at the end of history as Absolute, and the
essence of Absolute is perfection, however, the establishment of history’s end point demands that
there no longer be any flaws that serve as negation. As has been shown, there is still room for the
final tenets of Western liberalism to be expanded upon, ideally in a way that would enable those
who do not have as many economic or political liberties to advance, contrary to Fukuyama’s
thesis. Inversely, if the progress of Spirit is measured by the level of freedom inherent in the
nation, it would seem shortsighted to accept Fukuyama’s notion of Western liberalism as the end
all if there is still room for those who are fortunate enough to be in power to build a fort of
protection that allows them to be “more free” than those who are not in power.

That being the

case, how can we have already arrived at the final form of government if we are still trying to
perfect the one we are at? While Fukuyama’s position is based on the fact that the fall of the Berlin
Wall signals the decisive end of history, I believe it is preemptive at best. If the more recent forms
of the National Defense Authorization Act, which conveniently passed measures that prohibited
some of the very actions from the Occupy movement,85 teaches us anything, it is that even in the
nation that is the purported harbinger of freedom, the notion of liberalism can easily be
manipulated to satisfy intrinsic desires under the guise of supposed protection from intangible
threats. This manipulation of power, of course, originates from the top, as very few people seldom
volunteer to have their freedoms taken away. Most damning of all is that as a result of this
constriction in liberties, the nation that is supposed to be the harbinger of Western liberalism has
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further erected walls that serve to attempt to confine Spirit’s actualization towards freedom. These
are all very real issues that no level of aesthetics will ever be able to mask, and if Hegel’s
conception of Spirit is to be believed, then it is only a matter of time before the thought of
“something better” enters the realm of consciousness.
As has been shown, the foundation for the thought of something better to be built upon has
already been laid by Wyschogrod’s heterological historian. In response to the increased access of
to the information culture, Wyschogrod argues that Spirit no longer needs to manifest through
Hegel’s slaughter bench. Rather, Wyschogrod posits that Spirit can unveil in ways productive to a
community united in hope by way of emphatic connections established through art. As alluded to
earlier, however, Wyschogrod feels as though Spirit is currently in a state where it is unable to
transcend images, for it is stuck in the very essence of what images are, a punctiform of time.
Regardless, Wyschogrod does not believe Spirit is confined entirely to this state of stasis, as Spirit
is capable of embracing infinitely many new perspectives. It is incumbent, then, on the
heterological historian to manipulate the information culture in such a way that allows them to “see
with the eye of the concept”,86 in hopes of “fathom[ing] the cunning of reason”87 in a more
conducive manner than Hegel’s slaughter bench. After all, if the point of historiography is to
provide the ocular tools by which to view the stream of past events, the intention would be to
provide the platform from which human history, as the ultimate quest for freedom, can ultimately
manifest as the Absolute.
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Chapter 3: Art And Responsibility
3.1

I Against I
Thus far, my focus has primarily been on referring to the “others” in my different accounts

of history as an ethereal amalgamation of varying collectives of marginalized people who are so
beyond the realm of sayability that they have simply been consigned the title of voiceless, dead
others. While it is easy to simply label those who are perceived to be the victims of histories
domineering historical narratives for the sake of brevity or convenience, it is the fundamental task
of the heterological historian to sort through the piles of dead others in order to give face to all
those who were and are rendered voiceless. In order to do so, I turn to Heidegger to arrive at a
working definition of what it means to be a ‘Being’ in the world, whether past, present, or future,
dead other or otherwise, in the form of Heidegger’s Dasein.
According to Heidegger, Dasein is an entity which “gets its character from what is inquired
about—namely being.”88 More specifically, Heidegger posits that Dasein, unlike any other
entities defined by scientific discourse, is that very being which is “ontically distinguished by the
fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it.”89 In regards to its characteristics,
Heidegger claims that Dasein is that Being which always understands itself in terms of its
existence. Heidegger claims that this existence is essentially a possibility of itself, faced with the
decision of whether to be or not to be itself in its own way of being in the world. Heidegger affirms
that Dasein has chosen its own possibilities, has had those possibilities given to it, or simply grew
up in them, which is what Heidegger means when he talks about Geworfeneit, or “throwness”.
Heidegger asserts that the individual Dasein is responsible for its existence, either by affirmation
or neglect, which he differentiates with the concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity.
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Furthermore, Heidegger notes that authenticity and inauthenticity are both ways in which Dasein’s
Being takes on a definite character, and that this character is defined through the structures of
Being-in-the-world.90 Additionally, Heidegger is firm in his belief that existence is only
straightened out through existing.
Given those ethical and ontological challenges, in order to first understand what it means to
live an idealized life, one must first understand what it means to be a singular entity in the world
such as a Dasein; that is, that sort of being that is responsible for taking responsibility for the
choices which confront it, either by acceptance or neglect. For Heidegger, the possibility to lead
authentic life is an individual matter; one can either choose to accept that their decisions and
projects are their very own, or neglect to raise questions about their life’s choices. This is a
challenge Wyschogrod’s heterological historian gladly accepts.
Furthermore, by using Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein, we can embark upon the messy
work that is necessary to attain a level of understanding that would enable one to commence the
sort of individualizing projects that gives meaning to one’s life. It is only from understanding these
sorts of existential projects, according to Heidegger, that we are able to get possibility structures
for ourselves from life. For my thesis, commencing in this way means that we learn how to look at
things in a different manner, a manner that enables us to embark upon the path of figuring things
out subjectively by beginning to understand the varying degrees of impact these projects have on
our life. Once one begins to think in this relatively “authentic” manner, more possibilities begin to
present themselves, to the point where one can begin to see the horizon of their possibility
structures. This, in turn, allows one to envision what it is they can genuinely and authentically be in
life, and thus begin to put in the work necessary to hopefully complete their given projects.
In order to truly understand what this entails, however, one must first come to terms with
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their own-most possibility structure, that is, the possibility of no more possibilities. Heidegger
presents this as becoming aware of the finitude of one’s existence that entails understanding that
one’s own death is inevitable, unknowable, and unpredictable. This is an event which, according to
Heidegger, must be experienced phenomenologically, and that until one understands this assertion,
one will not be able to live a truly authentic life. Once one comes to terms with the fact that not
only can one never truly understand the actuality of death until one actually dies, and that no one is
ever going to die for them, can someone then be in the position to understand or “own” death as
their own-most possibility structure and start to make their “own” decisions based on this
newfound horizon of possibilities. Understanding the definitive role that one’s own death plays in
figuring out their own possibility structures and the decisions related to them, then, serves as the
determining factor in the structuring of our possibility horizons.
Unfortunately, it is in the nature of being one of the dead others, a victim of the cataclysm,
to have their own-most possibilities stripped away from their horizon of possibilities. Furthermore,
in response to Fukuyama’s idealized version of Western liberalism, other others are completely
plugged into a system of rent seeking, where they are so busy trying to keep up with the mandates
of Western liberalism, such as a mortgage, utilities, et cetera, that, for the most part, they are not
free to philosophize about what their ideal life would consist of. That is not to say most people do
not have dreams and desires, but rather that there are other conditions that must first be met before
one can ever even embark upon the path of achieving them.
For some, these hindrances are the byproduct of simple financial difficulties that could be
overcome with various strategies aimed at accumulating the wealth necessary to advance them in
the corporate ladder of Western liberalism. As was previously shown, however, the trend of
upward mobility, particularly in the United States, is slowly declining. As a result, for others,
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especially those already suffering the disadvantage of not having had the fortune of being born into
an established Western liberalized state, it is not as easy of a task. Furthermore, if Wyschogrod is
correct, this may very well be the result of systematic conditions inherent in the economic
structures of Western liberalism designed to keep the marginalized others in substandard
conditions. These others are so busy wondering where their next meal is going to come from, that
they do not have time to sit around and wonder what they can contribute to the world before they
die. And whether this truly is a systematic effort or merely a byproduct of Western liberalism is
inconsequential; the fact of the matter remains that there are others who do not share equally in the
spoils of Western liberalism. The question then becomes: what is to be made of the Dasein who is
Being-in-the-world with the dead others?
It is incumbent upon the heterological historian, beginning with the foundation of a Dasein
established as an authentic being in the world, to understand how it is that one is going to embark
upon the project of manifesting one’s own subjective possibility structures to incorporate the dead
and voiceless others. In order to do so, the heterological historian must manipulate various
phenomenological tools that serve to focus their attention in such a way as to actually bring about
the completion of the project they desire. In doing so, ideally the heterological historian will be
able to give further explanations of what it is to be a Being-in-the-world-with-the-others, and what
such a responsibility entails. In order to do so, it is important to understand the role intentionality
plays in directing the mental acts of the heterological historian.
3.2

Without Her, we Are Lifeless Satellites Drifting
According to Andrew Spear,91 Husserl believes that there are three essential features that

define his central thesis of intentionality: intentional acts, intentional objects, and intentional
content. The first of these three, intentional acts, is defined as that which is said to be a particular
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mental event, such as perceiving, remembering, thinking, and so on. The second of these, an
intentional object, is that which the intentional act is directed upon, such as perceiving (act) music
(object), thinking about music, or remembering that piece of music that reminds one of a time past,
and so on. According to Husserl, there is no psychological reality between intentional acts and
objects which allows for one to have multiple intentional acts directed towards multiple intentional
objects. That is, though one is currently thinking about music, they can also remember that
completing a different task is equally, if not more, important than reflecting on the memories a
song stirs, though not simultaneously.
As for intentional content, it can be defined as “a description or set of information that the
subject takes to characterize or be applicable to the intentional objects of their thought.”92 In other
words, intentionality towards an object is always perceived in an independent sense, and is
therefore subjective to the individual’s own personal perspective. So in regards to one’s intending
towards music, the intentional content of their experience is uniquely their own. Any given Dasein
has their own personal thoughts, ideas, and overall intentions that are all part of the intentional
acts, objects, and content involved in the completion of the ultimate intention they hope to
accomplish, whatever it may be.
Furthermore, Husserl notes that it does not matter whether an intentional object is real or
not. This view is crucial in understanding the significance that non-physical objects play in our
lives. History, dreams, ideas, desires, et cetera have no physical merit; one cannot reach out and
manipulate their desire to make the world a better place the same way they can reach out and fulfill
their desire for a cleaner desk by picking up all of the items laying around. That does not, however,
imply that there is no efficacy to these conceptual desires.
To further clarify this point, Heidegger uses the example of a hallucination in The
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Fundamental Discoveries of Phenomenology, Its Principle, And The Clarification of Its Name, to
demonstrate the efficacy of non-physical objects. Using the example of an automobile that is not
present at hand, Heidegger notes that there is no coordination between the psychic and the
physical. Heidegger posits, however, that the “hallucination” of this imagined automobile is in
itself still a perception of something, namely an automobile. Heidegger further notes that this
perception, which is not intended towards any physically real object, is in itself directing itself
toward something presumably perceived. Therefore, even if this non-physical object is nothing
more than a hallucination, it is still an intentional act. As Heidegger himself specifically states
it is the case that perception, correct or deceptive, is in itself intentional. Intentionality
is not a property which would accrue to perception and belongs to it in certain instances.
As perception, it is intrinsically intentional, regardless of whether the perceived is in
reality on hand or not. Indeed, it is really only because perception as such is a directingitself-toward something, because intentionality constitutes the very structure of
comportment itself, that there can be anything like deceptive perception
and hallucination.93
While the heterological historian may not be able to physically manipulate concrete
objects, such as past events, that does not take away from the fact that they are intentional objects,
for, as Heidegger notes, intentionality does not take the form of an objective relationship between
physical and psychic processes, but rather is better understood as the structure of
directing-itself-toward. To further clarify this concept, Heidegger introduces his notion of empty
intending. According to Heidegger, empty intending is the mode of representing something in the
manner of thinking of something, or recalling it. In this particular instance, Heidegger refers to a
bridge which is not physically present, yet can be made the object of consciousness by intending
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oneself towards the location of the bridge. That is, the empty intending occurs simply by intending
the psychically absent bridge, a form of intentionality that Heidegger believes makes up the
majority of our day to day talk, for it is not physical objects we speak of when we refer to certain
physical objects, such as the bridge, but rather the matter of intending itself that includes the
intentional object. In regards to heterological historians speaking of the past, clearly they are not
speaking of a physical object, but rather of an ethereal substance that seeks to formulate in one’s
mind the vision we have of some un-constructed reality.
Heidegger proceeds to present both an example of the distinction he is making, as well as
an explanation of how it is that an intentionality can be fulfilled through intuition by offering the
example of his desk at home and his relation intending towards it. Heidegger notes that at first, this
is nothing more than empty intending towards an object for the sole purpose of example. He notes,
however, that he can fulfill this empty intention in two ways, the first of which is simply by
envisaging the desk, and the second of which is actually going home and seeing the desk in an
authentic and final experience.
Similarly, the heterological historian can speak of the dead others as an empty intention,
but they can also envisage them by way of various tools offered by the information culture and, as
a result, imagine what they believe life for the dead and voiceless others was/is like, what it would
perhaps be like to be in their position, the feelings they may have were they to be in their position,
or perhaps even the outcomes that may result from being in their position. As such, the
heterological historian has this intangible yet very real intention of something that, although may
not be as simple as going home and witnessing a desk, can be fulfilled under the right
circumstances.
In light of Heidegger’s views on intentionality, the heterological historian now has the
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backdrop for what it is to be Dasein faced with the task of envisioning a future existence that
includes concern for others who are not yet physically represented. Furthermore, through an
understanding of, and ability to manipulate intentionality as a phenomenological tool capable of
adequately operating with non-physical mental objects, the heterological historian also has a
crucial instrument necessary to begin constructing possibility structures that take into account the
potential plight of others.
3.3

Cowboy Dan and The Lonesome Crowded West
As alluded to earlier, Being-in-the-world is an essential characteristic of Dasein.

Specifically, unlike the spatio-temporal location of physical objects, Dasein’s being-in-the-world
is defined as having an actual, existential relationship with the world itself. That is, although a
computer, like one’s self, is located within a house, a computer does not share the relationship one
does with their house. A computer does not come home after a long day of school thankful to be
home, nor does it refer to their house as a home; it is merely a place where the computer is stored.
For Dasein, however, a house is a place to escape the elements, a place to retreat to when
overburdened, tired, lonely, or afraid. Much like a house, there are other places on earth where
Dasein finds itself at home, such as a childhood home or in a city. Unlike a computer, which is just
located in the world, Dasein could be said to be dwelling within it. This dwelling in the world is a
feature characteristic of all Dasein.
Having arrived at an understanding of what it is to be a Dasein Being-in-the-world, the
heterological historian is still left with the question of what they are to do with their lives while
they are here. The solution was alluded to earlier in the form of intentionality and possibility
structures, but there seems to be a crucial element missing, for as it stands, we have only the
numbers to an equation, and lack the mathematical symbol necessary illustrate what action needs
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to be taken. Simply put, the missing function is involvement, a key facet in the responsibility of the
heterological historian. In its Being-in-the-world, Dasein is able to interact with the environment
by means of intentionality and to manipulate its malleable nature to fit its specific needs and
desires. This involvement can take a literal, physical form, such as when Dasein builds a house
with bare hands to protect themselves from nature, or it can take the form of manifesting a thought
in one’s mind by projecting it through three dimensional space through sound so that others who
have both a syntactical and semantic understanding of the vibrations created by their vocal chords
can be similarly affected by the emotion or thought Dasein is attempting to convey. Whatever the
case, according to Michael Wheeler,94 Heidegger, believes this involvement involves multiple
facets of Being-in-the-world, what Wheeler calls a totality of involvements.
In order to demonstrate the magnitude of this claim, Wheeler offers a Heideggerian
example of how these totality of involvements come into play. Using the example of a hammer,
Wheeler shows how a hammer is involved in the act of hammering, which is involved in the act of
building something, which is involved in the act of protecting Dasein’s from nature. These entities
are thus defined not simply by the actions they perform, but by the purposes the serve Dasein.
Wheeler notes that as this chain of network events progresses, worlds are created. Similarly, the
heterological historian uses the various tools of the information culture at their disposal, such as a
camera, in order to build windows into new worlds of the dead others that were once inaccessible.
As a result, it is understood that the heterological historian’s role, whether large or small, plays a
crucial role in developing the platform from which the telling of various forgotten events comes to
fruition.
Wheeler goes on to demonstrate how the worlds in which we are involved are not a
harmonized process, and that it is only through disturbance that we come to understand the effect
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these involvements have in shaping our intentionality. To modify the example given by Wheeler,
the heterological historian could be at their computer room highlighting various cataclysms in
hopes of bringing the struggle of the dead others to the forefront of consciousness. While they may
be entranced by a forgotten world visible at the moment only through a computer screen,
occasionally, an innocuous event, such as the ringing of a phone, may snap them out of delirium
and remind them that they also have plans to meet up with friends for dinner. In that respect, the
heterological historian as Dasein is entrenched in two separate worlds that direct their
heterological and auxiliary intentionality simultaneously yet at different levels of involvement at
any given time.
Perhaps most crucially for the heterological historian, however, is, given Wyschogrod’s
previously defined prerequisites, the heterological historian is able to position themselves into two
different worlds simultaneously, all while avoiding instantiating their own personal spirit on the
culture of the others which they are witnessing through the lens of technology. This ability is in
stark contrast to that of individuals such as Fukuyama who, sincere as his intentions may have
been, is unfortunately unable to capture life from the perspective of someone not granted a similar
privileged position of power. According to Heidegger, these ultimate involvements, these
for-the-sake-of-which, are all invariably connected to the other events involvements in one’s life.
Therefore, there are no isolated events; all things are inexplicably related to the others, and any
individual action is liable to affect the collective, either directly or indirectly, blatantly or furtively.
This is important, as Heidegger believes Dasein is constantly choosing the way it intends its life to
be. Furthermore, Wheeler notes that Heidegger believes they95 also serve as a way in which the
projects and possibilities of Dasein are related to the way other entities may become intelligible.
Wheeler notes that this is because these for-the-sake-of-which levels are both a launching pad for
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possible equipment-defining totalities as well as an opportunity for Dasein to demonstrate what it
is or can be. Simply put, at any given moment, one can be made aware of both the equipment, such
as Heidegger’s tool box or the information culture, which defines one’s actions, as well as the
possibilities and/or unacknowledged desires one possesses. As a result, one is never out of reach
from coming to terms with the plight of the others, nor understanding how one’s actions as a
possible heterological historian can help bring an end to senseless suffering.
3.4

I Got no Time For Livin’, Yes I’m Working All The Time
Thus far, our intentionality has been directed towards the various phenomenological

equipment that the heterological historian can manipulate in their quest to give voice to the others,
and educated on how it can be applied theoretically. It can also, however be applied practically, a
task Arendt set out to accomplish in Labor, Work, Action. Beginning with the questions, “What
does an active life consist of? What do we do when we are active?”96 Arendt proceeds to lay out
her argument for what she believes the vita activa, or active life, is, and how it relates to the
contemplative life, or vita contemplativa. Arendt states that an active life is that which most men
are engaged in and cannot escape altogether, noting that through labor, work, and action we ensure
the ability to lead a life of contemplation. Most notably, Arendt remarks that action is necessary
“in order to organize the living together of many human beings in such a way that peace, the
condition for the quiet of contemplation, is assured.”97
Like Heidegger, Arendt believes that Dasein defines itself through the work they do, noting
that the work of our hands, as distinguished from the labor of our bodies, fabricates the sheer
unending variety of things whose sum total…[is] the world we live in.”98 To that extent, much like
Heidegger, it could be said that the decision to live an active life is a personal one that Dasein has
96
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the perpetual choice to make. For Arendt, however, it is through works of art that Dasein manifests
the distinction of an inherent duality between work and laboring for the means of survival.
According to Arendt, the work of art is meant to create an object of permanence, unlike work and
labor, who’s toils inevitably get sucked back into the earth from which they arose. Arendt, drawing
from her inner Husserlian and Heideggerian roots, argues that, despite the fact that the inspiration
that led to the creation of these works of art are thoughts (non-physical objects) this does not
prevent them from being things. Arendt contends
it is the reification that occurs in writing something down, painting an image, composing
a piece of music, et cetera which actually makes the thought a reality; and in order to
produce these thought things, which we usually call art works, the same workmanship is
required that through the primordial instrument of human hands builds the other, less
durable and more useful things to the human artifice.99
In other words, it does not matter whether it is labor, work, or action intending their own unique
interests, the fact remains that actual work as effort is needed in order to manifest them. Whether it
be the labor necessary to protect Dasein from nature, the work necessary to create a piece of
furniture, or the freedom and action necessary to manifest a dream or create a work of art:
concerted effort, choosing to live a life of authentic action, is necessary to ensure a meaningful life.
The problem, once again, remains that a vast majority of people living under the conditions
afforded by Western liberalism in its current incarnation are unable to partake in such pleasures as
works of art, for they are too engaged in the labor necessary for their survival.
Regardless, Arendt believes that non-biological life from birth to death manifests itself in
action and speech, and through it we insert ourselves into the world. Arendt goes on to discuss how
in our differences, namely in our distinctly original ways of expressing our Being, we share a
99

Moran, Dermot et al PG 366

60

uniqueness with the others who are also Being-in-the-world with us. Given that, the only way to
distinguish ourselves from the others is through expressing our individuality, a self-affirming act
that establishes us as unique individuals. Unlike being born, Arendt notes, this insertion is not
forced upon Dasein. Rather, it is a conscious choice Dasein makes, a choice which is driven by an
internal impulse embedded in Dasein from the moment it is born. The impulse, according to
Arendt, is an initiative prompting Dasein towards action.
This view is most readily embodied by Nietzsche’s views on the will to power. In Beyond
Good and Evil, Nietzsche asks that we suppose if we finally succeeded in explaining our entire
instinctive life as the development and ramification of one basic form of the will, the will to
power.100 Nietzsche states that all organic functions could be traced back to this will to power, and
that from it, so to the understanding that it is our needs that interpret the world. That is, while some
are perhaps content with getting by with the bare minimum, many others seem to be driven
towards completing tasks that increase their level of power. What these tasks are naturally vary by
individual, but what both Arendt and Nietzsche have made clear is that there is invariably a driving
force that pushes most individuals towards achieving the outward expression of their individuality.
Per Nietzsche,
What is good? Everything that heightens the feeling of power in man, the will to power,
power itself. What is bad? Everything that is born of weakness. What is happiness? The
feeling that power is growing, that resistance is overcome. Not contentedness but more
power; not peace but war; not virtue but fitness…101
That said, there seems to be an inherent desire in all individuals to insert themselves in the
world as a means of satisfying some form or preternatural power that drives them as a unique
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individual. This is best represented by Wyschogrod’s example of Billie Joe, the homeless man she
once met while standing guard at a moving van, who rather than heed Wyschogrod’s advice of
going to the hospital, simply asked that she remember his name. This Nietzschean will to power
plays a crucial role in the arsenal of the heterological historian, however, for now, it will suffice to
note that Nietzsche’s views on the will to power dictate that every specific body strives to become
master over all of space and to extend its will to power by “thrusting back” everything that that
resists its extension. In doing so, however, it continually encounters other bodies with similar
desires, a paradox that is resolved only through the merging of power.

102

Similarly, Arendt goes on to note that, despite this newfound individuality, we are still
conditioned by human plurality, by our Being-in-the-world-with-others, for we are not alone in
this world. Arendt notes that wherever Dasein lives together, there exists a web of relationships
that is woven by the deeds on the words of countless other Dasein, both those alive and dead. Much
like Heidegger’s views on the for-the-sake-of-which, Arendt believes this interconnected web is a
way to suggest how our experiences of action and speech are inter-related in a totality. That is, the
actions of any one individual Dasein has the potential to be felt by the collective Dasein as a whole.
As Arendt states
The smallest act in the most limited circumstances bears the seed of the same
boundlessness and unpredictability; one deed, one gesture, one word may suffice to
change every constellation; In acting, in contradistinction to working, it is indeed true
that we can really never know what we are doing.103
3.5

World, Hold On
This condition of coming to terms with our plurality in the world is perhaps as important as
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understanding that we are Dasein living under the precepts of our own most possibility structures.
The problem with this, of course is two-fold; first, how do we even know other people have similar
psychological states and experiences like myself, and secondly, why should I care that they do?
The general response to the former is that one can infer from actions that other individuals are in
fact Dasein much like myself and not automata or machine; that is, if I punch someone in the face,
chances are they are either going to try to duck it or be in pain. While this response suffices in
regards to the first question posed, it certainly has no answer to the second. That is not to say,
however, that the question cannot be answered.
According to Edith Stein, one can get to know the existence of another Dasein through
empathy. According to Kris McDaniels, Stein’s use of empathy can be defined as an irreducible
intentional state in which both other persons and the mental states of other persons are given to
us.104 Moreover, empathy allows us to see our fellow Dasein as much more than just another body
in motion, but rather as a feeling individual that is capable of experiencing the same amount of
emotional range as I am. That is, the joy I feel when accomplishing a goal is just as real for me as
it is for someone else who is accomplishing their own respective goals, as is the pain I would feel if
I were to be punched in the face just as they would.
3.6

Redemption Song
In returning to Wyschogrod, the heterological historian, as future subject of history, must

acknowledge the binarism of time and the role it plays in establishing intersubjectivity.
Wyschogrod notes that “past events cannot be lived in the manner of firstness but merely relived in
memory as the etiolated images, the replicas, of what they had been.”105 At the same time,
however, if the heterological historian is to be able to complete their work, they must be able to
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re-surrect the past as it was by somehow inhabiting the past they wish to recover. This can most
obviously be done in the temporal world in which one presently thinks of the past. Unlike
Fukuyama, the heterological historian is able to utilize skepsis in order to avoid surveying the
historical topography from a panopticon and, as such, the heterological historian has available to
them the ability to traverse time and space in order to be able to adequately express the conditions
in which the others found themselves relegated to throughout history.
While this has yet to be done physically, philosophers such as Herder believe this act of
transgression can be achieved by literally immersing oneself in the Spirit of the culture they are
attempting to define. One way in which this could be done, according to Herder, is by “feeling”
one’s way through the history of others. Instead of considering historical predecessors inferior, the
heterological historian actively pursues a means in which to empathize with their position. In
doing so, not only does the heterological historian pinpoint a starting point for understanding, they
also open up a space in which ethics can come into play. For Wyschogrod, this would imply an
ethics of understanding that allows us to “feel” the particular terrors or cataclysms that previous
people and cultures experienced. In doing so, the heterological historian manufactures the
framework from which an outside observer may be put in a position where they can then
empathize with the struggle of the others, an act Herder found crucial to truly understanding
history.
In a move that predates Wyschogrod, Herder notes that through studying the precursor for
the technological image, art, the heterological historian can identify with a culture, and in doing so,
literally immerses themselves in the Spirit of a given period. In doing so, this move towards
empathy would ideally put both the heterological historian and the future subjects of history in a
position where they would be shaken out of their state of apathy towards the conditions of the
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others, and into a new form of consciousness, one in which individuals make a concerted effort to
avoid having future others experience similar travesties.
Furthermore, Wyschogrod notes that, with the advent of Husserlian phenomenology, the
act of physically looking at an image has taken on a life of its own. Instead of being a passive
process resulting from sensory stimulation, Wyschogrod notes that the phenomenological look is
an intentional act aimed at the world that either aims or fails to fill an empty intention with content.
Wyschogrod’s explanation of Sartrian and Foucaldian interpretations of the look is instructive in
this regard. She notes that for the former, the look is an act of violence that both allows the looker
to identify another person’s materiality with their consciousness, as well as an act of theft that
allows the other person to be deterritorialized, as the space around them is sucked towards the
lookers ocular intention. In that sense, the phenomenological look functions as a means of
unraveling the barriers inherent in anonymity that the heterological historian employs as a way of
deconstructing alterity.
For the latter, the look is an act of epistemic expression of an object under surveillance.
Wyschogrod notes that for Foucault, the gaze manifested with this intent are forms of social
control which simply seek to exercise a form of power over the those whose wellbeing is
purportedly of concern, citing various panoptical manifestations of this intent, such as prisons and
psychiatry wards, for example. Wyschogrod notes how this “gaze” is a Foucauldian take on
Sartre’s notion of the look with the added twist of it being given the seers invisibility from the
seen. Wyschogrod notes that this is a power structure that maintains the object of consciousness in
a perpetually vulnerable position, while the subject-who-looks remains in a position of power.
Clearly, this type of look is more synonymous with narratives such as Fukuyama’s The End
of Hisory?, for not only is Fukuyama speaking from a lofty perch that enables him to look over the
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topography of history from a position of power, as alluded to earlier, but in a way, doing so
subliminally comes with the intent of maintaining an illusory form of power. That is, by claiming
that conditions of subjugation, such as unequal wealth distribution, have been equalized in
Western society, Fukuyama spreads the potentially harmful, and certainly loaded, message that
wealth distribution really is not a problem when, as has been shown, that is not the case. If
Foucault is correct, then this sort of marginalizing can be understood as an attempt to maintain a
form of advantageous social control by implicitly saying, “do not worry that you are struggling to
get by, unemployed minority high school dropout who was born to a single mother in a crime
ridden neighborhood; it only appears that way. In actuality, you are doing just as fine as any other
American. And even if your conditions are not ideal, Western liberalism is no longer going to
evolve, so you may as well make the best of it, because this is the best of all possible worlds.”106
Furthermore, if Foucault is correct, then, as alluded to earlier, it is in Fukuyama’s best interest to
maintain such a narrative, in the hopes of keeping the subject-who-looks comfortably ensconced in
their position of power.
In this respect, Fukuyama’s biggest pitfall can be illuminated by using Nietzsche’s views
on the maladies of historiography, namely the fact that the study of history confuses sentiment or,
as Wyschogrod states, attempts to aestheticize that which cannot be aestheticized. Furthermore,
Nietzsche notes that history is recorded by those who did not make it, which in true Nietzschean
form, is essentially a warning to beware of those who claim to be harbingers of truth. Although
Fukuyama surely may have been in a position to influence some policy, the true merit of the
importance of the fall of the Berlin Wall could be better understood by the acts of those East and
West Germans who, after twenty-eight years of politicized separation, were finally able to unite
once more. This is a task that is difficult to do when surveying the situation from the vantage point
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of a panopticon, yet is easily accomplished by the heterological historian feeling their way through
the trenches, or the rubble of the wall that came down peacefully, in reconstructing how the events
transpired. Moreover, there seems to be an inherent arbitrariness in Fukuyama’s setting of
history’s end point, as well as his claim that the essence of the victory of liberty should provide us
with some sort of guideline for how to act into the future. To say that the “victory” of Western
liberalism is the end of history based on a historically significant event is shortsighted at best.
Lastly, in trying to be subjective, Nietzsche believes historiographers neuter history instead, a
naiveté born of their desire to objectify something as abstract as history. This is a frivolous game
for Nietzsche, who believes we must be weary of those who, like Fukuyama, try to also make of
the past a trivial game to fit their political preferences, and who cast off as superficially objective
anything that does not fit their understanding of the rational plan of history.
3.7

Nazi Punks: In The Real Fourth Reich, You’ll be The First to go (Unless You Think)
In light of the inherent duality of the phenomenological look, Wyschogrod posits whether

an object that serves to establish a narrative can avoid framing the perspective of its intended
audience. Despite the fact that it is in the nature of a camera lens to capture the unfiltered truth,
everything from subconscious motives to digital manipulation is likely to alter both the intended
and unintended narrative of an image. Wyschogrod, citing Benjamin, notes how this manipulation
is to be feared for, when applied improperly, images may serve to aesthetize a life that both causes
and feeds fascism, a form of control whose ultimate expression is war. In regards to Fukuyama, he
can attempt to paint a rosy picture with his victor’s narrative, but this is clearly a dangerous
position to take, as it negatively aestheticizes the very real plight of the others.
And it is this manipulated expression that Wyschogrod-reading-Benjamin is ultimately
afraid of, for, left unchecked, it would “release a nostalgia for and fetishization of a heroic past that
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inevitably leads to war.”107 Currently, one need look no further than the social media accounts of
combative’ to see attempts to aestheticize questionable events. In one instance, there is the
example of the Israeli soldier who depicts a photo of a young Palestinian whose head is in the
crosshairs of a sniper rifle, while in another, there is an al-Qaeda soldier whose account depicts
casualties of war run through various enhancing filters.
Furthermore, because such possibilities do exists, Wyschogrod notes that the heterological
historian must be wary of unintended audience responses, as well as the way in which visual
artifacts construct otherness, for fear of commodifying the others as exotic, marketable images.
Such an attempt to establish otherness is merely a facilitation of events that should be avoided by
the heterological historian by inserting themselves into the non-space of ethics. In this void, the
heterological historian is able to establish a nook in which they can seek reprieve from the excuse
of evasion from difficult subjects by inserting themselves into the contestation, a move which
inherently requires a stance.
To not take a stance, then, is the real issue, for as previously established, the heterological
historian must have both the courage and ability to take a stand and say “yes, this happened as
such, with proof being in the form of this here image.” Even in dealing with large-scale
phenomena, where individual parts may be lost in the overall whole, establishing one’s own
personal subjective experience is not so much a trite attempt at superficial “coffee shop
revolutionaryism” so much as an establishment of faciality. As Wyschogrod notes, both the
victimizer and the victim have faces, with the former clearly having the advantage of numbers on
their side. In this decidedly skewed balance, however, the voiceless, united by the common bonds
of cataclysm, gain presence in the form of image. And while an overabundance of these images
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may lead to a twisted form of hedonistic adaptation, Wyschogrod notes that it is the responsibility
of the heterological historian to battle back against this apathy and give credence to those who
were deemed expendable. By giving voice and face to the others, the heterological historian can
use the mass accrued by their collective weight to catapult their momentum into the front lines of
the collective ocular consciousness. Instead of the narrative propagated by the ruling class that
once maintained the sole source of images, and ipso facto the historical narrative, the collective
voice of the others now has the visual platform to solidify their stance and offer the unadulterated
perspective of history, as opposed to history, as sponsored by CNN.108
Such a shift in power leads to the increased ability for Dasein to “be there”. Ignorance is no
longer a sound excuse; in the age of social media, all one need to do is to intend their gaze at
images in an actively involved way, a way that serves as a means of deterittorializing the gap
between oneself and the others. Of course, in this dialectic, the influence of the affluent remains a
very real factor, and as such, the heterological historian must seek to avoid falling victim to
orchestrated images with ulterior intentions. This fear is most readily embodied by the damning
example of the official social media account of Bashar-al Assad, which, despite the prevailing
narrative of death and destruction currently emanating from Syria, depicts a president being
supported by his subjects in a time of peace. Because the possibility of such a manipulation exists,
and thus the advancement of potentially harmful narratives, Wyschogrod believes it is incumbent
upon the heterological historian to reclaim the image for the realm of ethics.
3.8

The Rose That Grew From Concrete
Despite the perceived differences inherent in the subjective phenomenological experience

of individual Dasein, the notion of empathy serves the important role in my thesis of establishing
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the mandate to relate ethically to others who are not us. One need look no further than the images
detailing unspeakable travesties, such as those highlighting victims of drone strikes, in order to
understand that the empathetic connection felt for a fellow Dasein who had the misfortune of being
born into conditions of alterity is very real, and that the responsibility to shed light on the
acceptance for conditions that allow Spirit to continue progressing through Hegel’s slaughter
bench is of utmost importance. This means that our phenomenological inquiry has now taken us
from objects of consciousness to considerations about a practice in ethics.
Ideally, once a Dasein has established their being-in-the-world’ness and gone about the
steps necessary to begin living their own personal self-actualized life, they would arrive to the
conclusion that others, who perhaps are not as fortunate as they, have similar aspirations of
self-actualization. This may be clearly obvious to some, but it seems as though for the majority of
people, such as Fukuyama, it is easier to just forgot about the others; in this land built upon pulling
oneself up by one’s boot straps, it is only the Alpha that is revered. Moreover, once the Alpha has
ascended the peak, they seem to be solely concerned with maintaining their coveted position,
willingly sabotaging any who try to lay claim to their throne, while forgetting about the others who
may never have had a chance to compete in the first place.
Once again, this seems to be the case with narratives such as Fukuyama’s The End of
History?, which, rather than reading like the insightful truth expected from a person in his position,
reads more like the blueprint to a defense strategy of ensconcing oneself in a position of power by
propagating the power structure that afforded them their position. That is, rather than making any
necessary changes to modify conditions that would ideally lead to the socio-political actualization
of terms such as “freedom”, and “liberty”, those who control the narrative seem intent on
attempting to maintain the status quo. This is readily seen in The End of History?, as Fukuyama
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proclaims that Western liberalism is the political conclusion of the history of political, ideological
conflict.
This seems like a relatively simple claim to make from the winning side of Western
liberalism, but what if you are stuck digging for conflict minerals under the threat of violence?
Fukuyama’s concept of “freedom” is simply too vague and besides. In a time when the nation long
held as the hallmark of Western liberalism is home to thousands of social media users who use
their respective accounts to display their lavish spending power, others use them to document the
hundreds of thousands of dissatisfied Americans lining up to protest the perceived abuse of the
financial infrastructure that propels Western liberalism.109
Following the mandates of Hegel’s spirit as searching for absolute, I assume that the
ultimate goal of the human experience is some form of universal equality which actualizes in the
form of a perfect nation. However, given the various ways in which history has repeatedly
unfurled, the methods employed thus far entail counterintuitive approaches to achieve such a goal.
That is, if Wyschogrod is correct, and there is in fact a systematic process of marginalization in
effect, it would appear as though some potentially key pieces to the ultimate puzzle are being
utterly ignored. For all we know, there may be a Dasein at this very point in time who has the
potential to cure cancer, and yet, given the fact that they were thrown into a world of poverty and
neglect, will never get a chance to so much as emptily intend the desire to be a molecular biologist,
let alone fulfill that intentionality, for they will be too busy struggling to get buy. As Arendt notes,
the life of action is dependent upon the life of contemplation, and vice versa, and if one is too busy
simply working just to get by, they will never have the chance to sit back and contemplate what it
means to live an actualized life. As a result, the task of the heterological historian takes on an
added significance in the sense that it is their moral responsibility to ensure the conditions are one
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day met in which all Dasein are able to partake in the spoils of Western liberalism, not solely those
affluent enough to buy into it.
The problem is, who is going to care? In a capitalist society of PlayStations and reality TV,
it is easy to get caught up in one’s own personal desires and ambitions, relegating those who were
thrown into a less fortunate situation as somehow less than you or I. The prevailing notion seems to
be to let them figure it out on their own, which is understandable, to an extent. If social psychology
has taught us anything, it is that hedonistic adaptation dictates that people cannot simply be given
things.110 This is not a point I am contesting. Rather, I am merely drawing attention to the fact that,
as children, we are all told that change will never happen unless you try to bring about that change
on your own; as Mahatma Gandhi once said, we must all be the change that you wish to see in the
world.111
The change that the heterological historian wishes to see is simple; the improvement of
conditions for past, present, and future others. To preach to the end of history while others are still
within the grips of a cataclysm, all the while denying that there exists such a state, is simply no
longer an option. Take for example the infomercials on TV showing emaciated children in tears.
Despite the precarious organization’s the ads are attached to, the message delivered by these dollar
a day charities is quite clear; even with the prevalence of Western liberalism, there are people the
world over who are struggling. It is a phenomenon that, thanks to the advent of various information
channels, suffering can be seen through the images of the faces of others. In experiencing this
“imaged” emphatic intentionality, ideally it should become evident that it is nothing short of
greediness to continue along the path of self-actualization without taking the plight of the suffering
others into account.
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Ideal as this task may sound, it certainly is not new. Take for example Kant’s ethics of
deontology.112 In The Foundations of The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant gives us examples of a
failure of duty, to which he offers a rebuttal. For our purposes, we need only focus on the final two,
the first of which poses the example of a person with a talent that, through cultivation, could make
them useful to many people. Kant continues that rather than cultivate this talent, however, this
person would revel in the mundane pleasures of life, essentially neglecting the gifts they have been
given. Kant notes that this cannot be willed into a universal maxim, however, for in such a world
where everybody resigns themselves to neglecting their gifts, nothing would essentially ever be
accomplished, and thus, it is incumbent upon them to maximize their potential.
Additionally, Kant offers us the example of an individual who is living a well-off life. Kant
notes that this individual is not concerned with the struggles of the others, and believes that each
one should be left to be as happily as heaven wills or as they personally desire, and as such they
will not concern themselves with their welfare or their assistance in their time of need. Clearly this
last example is an explication of an unfortunately popular sentiment that has not only lasted for
centuries, but is most obviously evident in many modern Western liberal societies today. Kant
notes that, while this type of scenario could easily be willed into a law of nature, it is not ideal, for
if everyone acted in accordance to this principle, no one would ever be available to comfort even
the most well-off individual in a time of need.
For my purposes, what Kant offers with the categorical imperative is an ideal solution to
this problem, noting that
If, then, there is to be a supreme practical principle and, with respect to the human will, a
categorical imperative, it must be one such that, from the representation of what is
necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself, it constitutes an objective
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principle of the will and thus can serve as a universal practical law.113
Kant believes this principle is grounded in the belief that rational nature exists as an end in itself,
and I maintain that Dasein necessarily represents its being in this way. Kant notes that we represent
our existence merely as a subjective action, however, since we are also Being-in-this-world with
others, our actions have a cumulative objective effect, as per Heidegger’s for-the-sake-of-which
and Arendt’s concept of the interconnected web. As such, we should behave in a way where the
categorical imperative can be restated as the principle of humanity; that we act in a way that
considers humanity solely as an end, and never solely as a means.
Using this modified principle of absolute ethical concern for humanity, I return to Kant’s
scenarios, noting that in the former it is not enough that the actions we choose do not affect
humanity negatively. That is, even if withholding our potential ability does lead to negative
consequences, we must seek to harmonize our talents and our actions with the hopes of preventing
others from ever being treated as a means.
More importantly, Kant notes that the natural end that all of humanity has is their own
happiness. As such, Kant affirms that everyone must try, as far as their means permit, to further the
ends of others. Kant notes that although humanity might subsist, as clearly it has, without the
contribution of the advancement of the happiness of the others by not taking away from the means
from which the others would ideally be advanced, this is merely a negative form of contribution to
humanity as an end in itself. That is because, as Kant maintains, “the ends of a subject who is an
end in itself must as far as possible be also my ends, if that representation is to have its full effect on
me.”114
3.9
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In The Body As Object And Mechanistic Physiology, Maurice Merleau-Ponty offers his
belief that in communicating, we find our own subjective differences through which we are able to
discover that each one of us is in fact constituted differently as Dasein with different perspectives
to offer the world and each other. Although I accept this premise, I modify it in the sense that,
much like Kant proposed, in acknowledging our differences, we find that we all ultimately share
one thing in common; the desire to live a happy life. But why stop there? From a deontological
perspective, it would appear as though if one desires to live a self-actualized life, it further seems
that the limits of any human’s progression will always be bound to the limits of each and every one
of the others’ ability to lead the same life as well. In a more altruistic sense, once the heterological
historian has ideally reached a position in life where they are fortunate enough to have fulfilled the
essential levels of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, it is incumbent upon them to help the others get to
at least to an equal level.
Therefore, we will accept the supreme practical principle as that which calls for helping the
others achieve eudemonia. As Arendt says, the active life essentially works to serve the ends of
contemplation, and that it is only natural that the active life is described by those who themselves
followed the contemplative way of life aligned with a life of actions. This supreme practical
principle calls for those fortunate enough to be in a position to follow their own respective path to
eudemonia to leave the comforting shores of the contemplative life and embark upon the waters of
the active life in order for the others to be able to begin living the life of harmonizing
contemplation and ethical action. Ideally, this is where the heterological historian would insert
themselves into the world through both action and art by putting forth the claim: what is here was
as such, but it could have been otherwise.
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Chapter 4: My Name is Peace This is my Hour, Can I Get Just a Little More
Power?
4.1

Art of Subconscious Illusion
In Deriving Ethics from Action: A Nietzschean Version of Constitutivism, Paul Katsafanas

begins his enquiry by posing the question “How can we justify normative claims about what there
is reason to do, such as ‘there is reason not to lie,’ or ‘you should not murder’?” In response,
Katsafanas introduces constitutivism, which claims that action has a certain structural feature that
both constitutes events as actions and generates a standard of assessment for action. Essentially,
Katsafanas claims, the authority of normative claims arise from the bare fact that we are agents.115
Katsafanas proceeds to expand on this basic definition by introducing his own version of
constitutivism, which employs an examination of the structure of human motivation by way of
philosophical psychology in hopes of showing that action, in fact, has a constitutive aim that
ultimately generates conclusions about what there is reason to do. In order to do so, Katsafanas
relies on a Nietzschean interpretation of power, noting that, despite Nietzsche’s views on ethics,
power maintains a privileged normative status in Nietzschean philosophy, as we are committed to
it simply by virtue of acting. Essentially, Katsafanas argues that Nietzsche’s view that all actions
manifest and are to be evaluated in terms of “will to power” is an attempt to move from a claim
about the essential nature of action or willing to a claim about value. As a result, Katsafanas argues
that Nietzsche uses a claim about the constitutive features of action to derive a standard of success
for action.116
Katsafanas claims that the Nietzschean version of constitutivism is predicated off the
understanding that our actions are motivated by the distinctive psychological state known as the
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drive. Katsafanas maintains that since our actions are motivated by the drive, actions are thus
constitutively motivated at overcoming resistance. Katsafanas asserts that whenever we will an
end, we aim to not only achieve the end, but also to encounter and overcome any resistance that
arise in the process. Katsafanas affirms that this process can be used to ground normative
conclusions about what there is reason to do.117
Katsafanas proceeds to justify Nietzsche’s claim that power alone has a privileged
normative status by first introducing Nietzsche’s view that we must engage in a “revaluation of all
values”, in hopes of arriving at a presupposed principle which is itself exempt from revaluation.
For Katsafanas’ reading of Nietzsche, this principle is the will to power. As Katsafanas affirms,
however, the problem is Nietzsche himself endorses claims about value that call power’s
privileged status into question, citing Nietzsche’s claims that “there are altogether no moral facts”,
and that “there are no moral phenomena at all, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena.”
Rather, Nietzsche is wont to say that that value is merely created by human activities.118
Katsafanas offers three claims that Nietzsche accepts in regards to value, the first of which
being that power has a privileged normative status, that there are no objective values, or objective
facts about what is valuable, and lastly that all values are created by human activity. As Katsafanas
claims, however, the problem of establishing a normative status in Nietzschean terms still remains,
for if there are no objective values, and all values are created, why should power maintain a
privileged status?
4.2

A Toast to The Dead
In order to solve this paradox, Katsafanas introduces constitutivism, which essentially

states that there are reasons for action that arise merely from the fact that one is an agent. In order
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to clarify this claim, Katsafanas gives the example of the “phenomenon” of a chess game.
Katsafanas notes that it is simply not enough to move one’s pieces around the board in accordance
to the rules of the game. Rather, Katsafanas affirms that one must also have the aim of achieving
checkmate in mind, or else one is not really playing a game of chess. As a result, Katsafanas cites
that the aim of checkmate is non-optional for chess players, claiming that “if you are playing chess,
then you have the aim.”119
Katsafanas proceeds to demonstrate that the aim of checkmate can be altered by outside
influences and factors, but it cannot be entirely neglected. In order to demonstrate this point,
Katsafanas introduces the example of playing a game of chess with a child. Katsafanas
demonstrates how, despite the fact that the inevitable attainment of achieving checkmate may be
delayed in an attempt to teach the child how to play chess, the ultimate aim of achieving checkmate
cannot be entirely discarded, or else one will not really be playing chess. Rather, as Katsafanas
claims, one would be engaged in a more complex task, namely teaching how to teach a child how
to play chess, which has an entirely different constitutive aim.
In an attempt to further clarify a constitutive aim, Katsafanas offers the following criteria:
Let A be a type of attitude or event. Let G be a goal. The A constitutively aims at G if and
only if
(i) each token of A aims at G, and
(ii) aiming at G is part of what constitutes an attitude or event as a token of A.

To clarify, Katsafanas offers the example of A being the attitude of belief and G being
truth. According to Katsafanas, belief thus has a constitutive aim at truth if and only if each token
of belief aims at truth and aiming at truth is what constitutes an attitude as belief. In order to
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establish the importance of constitutive aims, Katsafanas notes that they offer a standard of
success. That is, as Katsafanas claims, if the purpose of chess is checkmate, then the level to which
checkmate is achieved will dictate the level of success enjoyed by the individual achieving
checkmate. Furthermore, as per the aforementioned views on intentionality, Katsafanas asserts
that various aims may interact and modify one another. Continuing on the chess example,
Katsafanas claims that while a particular move may serve to promote checkmate, while another
may promote a more rewarding experience, the player may have reason to choose the latter.
According to Katsafanas, constitutive aims are important in that they generate intrinsic,
non-optional standards of success. As a result, Katsafanas notes that if an action has a constitutive
aim, then that aim will be present in every instance of action. As a result, we are given a
non-optional standard of assessment for action that applies simply in virtue of something being an
action. As a result, Katsafanas affirms that Nietzsche’s views on will to power show that power is
the constitutive aim of willing (emphasis mine).120
As a result, Katsafanas believes that Nietzsche’s views on will to power essentially offer a
constitutivist argument for power. That is, as has been shown, there is some aim, power, that is
involved in every scenario of willing. Therefore, Katsafanas believes that, granting the logical
form of the argument, Nietzsche has a valid claim that power has a privileged normative status.
Most importantly, Katsafanas asserts that Nietzsche does not have to rely on the claim that power
is an objective value, for as previously shown, power is simply the standard of success by which
willing is measured. Therefore, Katsafanas claims that Nietzsche grounds power’s privileged
status in incapacity: it is the one value that cannot be given up, insofar as one is engaged in willing.
As a result, Katsafanas asserts that Nietzsche has clarified any misconceptions that originally arose
from his three views that power has a privileged normative status, that there are no objective moral
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values, and that values are created.121
4.3

I’m Livin’ in the 21st Century Doing Something Mean to it
In order to defend this view, Katsafanas believes it is important to defend two

presuppositions inherent in establishing this claim, the former being a conceptual claim, the latter
an empirical one. Specifically, Katsafanas first highlights the nature of the drive, noting that its
structure dictates any drive-motivated action will in fact have the constitutive aim of overcoming
resistance. Katsafanas notes that drives are motivational states that aim at their own continuous
expression. Furthermore, aiming at continuous expression entails aiming to encounter resistances
to overcome, as per the will to power. As a result, Katsafanas concludes that drive-motivated
activities aim at encountering and overcoming resistance. Therefore, as per the previously
established definition of constitutive aim, Katsafanas affirms that drive-motivated activities have
the constitutive aim of overcoming resistance.

122

In regards to the latter, Katsafanas seeks to validate Nietzsche’s view that all human
actions are drive-motivated, as this will anchor the claim that human action has the constitutive
aim of overcoming resistance. In order to solidify this point, Katsafanas relies on Nietzsche’s take
on the nature of satisfaction, which affirms that the nature of human satisfaction indicates that
human actions are drive motivated. As a result, Katsafanas establishes the first premise in
Nietzsche’s argument:
(A) There is no state such that being in that state provides lasting satisfaction.
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In contrast to various utilitarian philosophers, Katsafanas claims that Nietzsche believes it
is not the utilitarian conception of happiness as an experiential state that is the issue, but rather the
issue of happiness as a state. Katsafanas’ reading of Nietzsche notes that Nietzsche rejects the
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state-based conception of happiness, claiming that it is not a state at all. Rather,
Katsafanas-reading-Nietzsche claims that happiness obtains when engaged in efficacious pursuit
of a goal, not when we attain the goal. Katsafanas asserts that we think we are satisfied by stasis, by
being in a state of having attained some goal, but that we are really satisfied by successful activity,
by actively seeking and attaining goals. Katsafanas highlights that claim by setting forth the
argument that:
(B) There are processes such that engaging in those processes provides lasting
satisfaction

124

That is, Katsafanas’ reading of Nietzsche dictates that there are processes such that
engaging in said process provides satisfaction so long as the process lasts. Furthermore,
Katsafanas claims that this view is supported by recent empirical work in psychological research
that claims human beings are most satisfied when engaged in activities that provide them with
challenges that are neither too easy nor to difficult. Specifically, Katsafanas claims that
“enjoyment appears at the boundary between boredom and anxiety, when challenges are just
balanced with the person’s capacity to act.”125
As a result, Katsafanas asserts that the conditions of human satisfaction have a decidedly
odd structure in that humans desire to achieve certain ends, and are satisfied when doing so, yet not
so when the ends are met. As Katsafanas’-reading-Nietzsche claims, we aim to engage in the
process of encountering and overcoming resistances in the pursuit of ends, for humans are
motivated by drives. Katsafanas asserts that drives aim at their own expression, and take objects
solely as an occasion for expression. Furthermore, Katsafanas notes that the attainment of objects
does not satisfy the drive; only the performance of the drive’s characteristic form of activity serves
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as a means of satisfaction.126
4.4

Justice Could Just be Clearing a Path For People to Dream Properly
Katsafanas posits that, using this Nietzschean model, the standard of success to generate

ethical claims manifests in two different ways, the first of which being the view that we have
reason to seek actions that afford resistance. Per this view, Katsafanas notes that two prescriptions
must first be taken into account. First, the action an agent chooses is dependent upon facts of their
capacities and psychological makeup. That is, Katsafanas believes that an individual has reason to
pursue those activities that afford difficulties that can be overcome, but not so difficult that they
cannot be overcome.
Secondly, Katsafanas notes that the results are dependent on an individual’s environment,
affirming that the particular course of action that constitute the highest realization of will to power
differ according to the circumstances an agent finds themselves in. Katsafanas reminds us that this
has had varied success throughout history, particularly in regards to historical epochs in which the
highest expression of will to power manifested itself in physical violence and subjugation of one’s
enemies. As Katsafanas ascertains, it is important not to filter Nietzsche, who was well aware that
an implication of his view is the fact that, under certain pre-societal conditions, the flourishing
human being will be the one who engages in the most horrific acts of oppression and subjugation.
Katsafanas affirms, however, that Nietzsche’s view does not condone such behavior, but rather
calls upon individuals to engage in artistic creation, the pursuit of self-understanding, and the
willingness to engage in suffering to achieve one’s goals.127
Katsafanas proceeds to assert that Nietzsche does not believe power is the only value
affecting perception and deliberation, nor that it should be. Rather, Nietzsche affirms that new
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values should be created, using the will to power as a “principle of reevaluation”. As a result,
Katsafanas affirms that this reading lends itself to the view
…that facts about which actions we have reason to perform are determined not only by
the degree of resistance that the potential actions afford, but also by facts about the
relationship between potential actions and our values; however, these values must in
some way be vetted by the standard of will to power.128
Katsafanas claims that an agents values constrain and influence their behavior. Therefore,
Katsafanas asserts that the agent’s values will interact with action’s constitutive standard, which in
turn generate claims about which acts there is reason to perform, and ipso fact, the agent’s values
as well.129
Katsafanas maintains, however, that Nietzsche’s ethical theory requires that we assess
potential acts along three dimensions, the first being the extent to which the act would present
opportunities for encountering and overcoming resistance. The second of these dimensions should
determine whether an act is permitted, recommended, or forbidden by the other values we
embrace. Lastly, Katsafanas affirms that the extent to which the values derived from the second
assertion should be compatible with the will to power. Through this, Katsafanas asserts that
normative results can be generated.130
4.5

The Message And The Money
It would appear as though, through Katsafanas, the heterological historian is now able to

establish normative claims from the non-space of ethics instantiated upon them by the cataclysm.
From this non-space, the heterological historian, citing past instances of subjugation and injustice,
can ideally make value claims based of what they believe ought to be done to preserve the memory
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of past, present, and future dead others. That is, citing a Nietzschean interpretation of
constitutivism, the heterological historian can anchor their normative claim that “it ought not to
have been thus.”131
In that respect, the heterological historian can begin by making the normative claim that, in
as far as one has satisfied certain levels of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, one is morally obligated to
take into consideration the plight of the others. More specifically, as per Katsafanas’ above
mentioned clarification on Nietzsche’s views one will to power, one is morally required to take up,
amongst other things, artistic creation. In that regard, the heterological historian would ideally be
called to insert themselves in to the world via various forms of artistic expression, such as
photography, music, or artwork, to name a few, as a means by which they promote the plight of the
dead others, all while avoiding the pre-established pitfalls of apathy, fascism, et cetera. In doing
so, ideally the heterological historian would begin to open windows from which the plight of the
others can enter the stream of consciousness of those who otherwise would never have heard of
them or their struggle had it not been made aware to them.
Take for example the musician Felipe Andres Coronel, better known by his stage name
Immortal Technique. Aside from using profits from his record sales to promote various social
causes, such as building an orphanage for children in Kabul, Afghanistan,132 Coronel has used his
position as an influential musician in the hip-hop community to promote awareness towards the
plight of the others. In one particular instance, Coronel was filmed at a Freedom for Palestine
benefit concert, where Coronel proceeds to recite lyrics to his song Toast to the Dead, stating:
Here’s a toast to the dead… for the freedom fighter killed by the Feds, for those who died
hard in the streets soaking in red… A toast to the dead for those that I’ve forgotten,

131
132

Wyschogrod, Edith xvii
Farooq, Sajid

84

written out of history by the corrupted and rotten. Black saints whitewashed during La
Reconquista. Thousands of Indios, Spaniards used to conquer the Incas… Long live
those who came before me, the warriors and the scientists that came before slavery…
Here’s a toast to the dead for all of my fam, I’ll never let an idea die with a man… But
some of you won’t survive the changes the earth makes, swallowed up by tsunamis
hurricanes and earthquakes. And that’s just the first stage of ‘you can’t reverse ways’,
and realize that we are one, regardless of our birthplace.
After concluding, Coronel proceeds to discuss how, following the attacks on the Twin Towers, he
was approached by various individuals asking if he was sure he wanted to continue supporting
Palestine. Coronel responds by stating
I won’t allow you to demonize these people. I won’t allow you to play the video from
1992 and tell me that those children were cheering the towers fall when you threw candy
to them ten years ago in the streets, you lying sons of bitches… I won’t let you use it as a
tool to divide Christian Palestinians and Muslim Palestinians…
Through his actions and words, Coronel is not only employing various tools of the
heterological historian, such as a leeriness towards the manipulation of photographs and the
overall intent such a manipulation hopes to establish, but is also responding to Nietzsche’s beliefs
that one need engage themselves in artistic creation. Furthermore, as the level of his commitment
towards promoting the plight of the others would dictate, Coronel is also willing to engage in the
suffering necessary to achieve one’s goals. What the process of Coronel’s self-discovery is
certainly a personal issue, but that is not the matter at hand.
Rather, the focus lies in the fact that, beginning with the normative claim that one is
morally required to take into account the plight of the others, the heterological historian now has
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the means by which to challenge those who are undecided to take action. That is, if the world truly
is filled with only two kinds of people, those who do harm and those who see harm and do nothing,
the heterological historian is now able to anchor the catch twenty-two that, refusing to partake in
the alleviation of needless suffering is to willingly partake in its perpetuation, as dictated by tacit
consent.
Take for example Katsafanas’ instance of deciding to watch television as opposed to
working on a difficult philosophical problem, as opposed of the opposite. Katsafanas notes that,
while continuing to work on the problem offers the most resistance, and thus satisfies Nietzsche’s
demands, given the fact that he has worked on the philosophy problem for several hours, to sit
back and watch television is not really a bad thing. The problem really arises when dealing with
extended periods of time, such as if he were to decide to simply continue relaxing, and ultimately
completely stop working on the problem. In a move reminiscent of Kant, Katsafanas proceeds to
show how, in the long run, one generally has more reason to perform the action that better fulfills
the constitutive aim. Furthermore, Katsafanas claims that it is not the weight of the
constitutive-aim derived reasons that generate this normative conclusion, but rather their ubiquity
and pervasiveness.133 In heterological terms, it is not so much that the personal leisure afforded by
watching television that is to blame, rather it is that the overall amount of needless suffering that
needs attention.
Harkening back to Heidegger’s views on for-the-sake-of-which, imagine a world in which
Coronel decided not to rap. In the Hegelian sense, perhaps somebody would have come along and
taken his place, but in a more phenomenological sense, Coronel’s own personal subjective
experience could never be duplicated, and thus, neither his own personal impact. So while another
rapper may have come along to speak a similar message, the lack of rappers lining up to build
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orphanages before Coronel leads one to believe that they most likely would never have had the
same impact that he has. Furthermore, assume an adolescent child, who has never heard of the
struggle in the Middle East, is hearing Coronel’s views for the first time. Maybe they will have
learned of the struggle later on in life, or perhaps they never would have been turned onto the
plight of Palestinians, who knows. What is certain, however, is that had Coronel not dedicated so
much time and effort to bringing awareness to the cause, the unfortunate Palestinian who was
rendered voiceless would continue to do so until someone did.
4.6

Homeland And Hip-Hop
Moreover, in light of Katsafanas’ claims, Fukuyama’s views on the end of history become

decidedly more burdened, namely in regards to Nietzsche’s views on the will to power. For one,
although Fukuyama is not necessarily making a normative claim, in stating that history has come
to an end, he is establishing an arbitrary standard. And much like Nietzsche’s views on morality,
Fukuyama’s claim is one that can easily be called into question by the will to power; a two front
process that questions both Fukuyama’s and the heterological historian’s claims
That is, Fukuyama’s claim can clearly be defended by the will to power. As alluded to
earlier, Katsafanas notes that the results of will to power are dependent on an individual’s
environment, and that the highest realization of will to power differ according to the circumstances
an agent finds themselves in. This is particularly difficult when the will to power is manifested by
individuals in the position of power, for as Katsafanas reminds us, this expression of will to power
manifested itself in physical violence and subjugation. As Katsafanas-reading-Nietzsche
ascertains, the flourishing human being will be the one who engages in the most horrific acts of
oppression and subjugation.134 That said, given the previously established critique that it is in the
nature of those in power to try and remain in power by any means necessary, it would appear as
134

Katsafanas, Paul

87

though, given the various conditions of subjugation the others still find themselves in despite the
incursion of Western liberalism, Fukuyama’s intentions, as altruistic as they perhaps may have
been, are disingenuous at best.
4.7

Bullet With Butterfly Wings
Specifically, if Western liberalism in its current state truly is the end all, how is it possible

that others, particularly those already enmeshed in Western liberalism, are still being subjugated?
In this respect, as Katsafanas believes, Nietzsche was not concerned with establishing power as the
sole value of legitimacy, and as such, leaves open the possibility for new values to be formed.
While Fukuyama’s argument is not ethically driven, In The End of History?, we do see him try,
and fail, to establish a privileged claim of his own, namely that history has come to an end by way
of the fall of the Berlin Wall. As Katsafanas maintains, Nietzsche requires that we assess potential
acts along three dimensions before accepting them as new values. Instead of focusing on Western
liberalism as a whole, it will suffice to focus on a particular instance, which, in conformity to
Fukuyama’s standard, will be the access to consumer culture.
As Katsafanas-reading-Nietzsche notes, to make a value claim is simply to state an object
of valuing. That is, to say that access to consumer culture is a value is merely to say that one values
access to consumer culture. Furthermore, valuing consumer culture has a certain kind of affective
response, and that certain kinds of judgments can be made about valuing consumer culture, both of
which are dependent upon the type of object or state of affairs being valued. As alluded to earlier,
Katsafanas proceeds to assert that an agent’s values, in this instance, Fukuyama’s valuing of
access to consumer culture, constrains and influences their behavior, and that an agent’s values
will interact with the constitutive action, which in turn generate claims about which acts there are
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reason to perform.
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In regards to Fukuyama, it clear to see that he satisfies all three of these requirements. Not
only has Fukuyama’s valuing of access to consumer culture led him to declare the end of history,
satisfying the affective response criteria, it also serves as the standard for success of Western
liberalism, and as a result the level of access to consumer culture afforded to an individual in
question also satisfies Nietzsche’s judgment criteria. In turn, both of these requisites are simply
byproducts of the state of affairs being valued, namely access to consumer culture. That is, if
Fukuyama values access to consumer culture, then it stands to reason that his standard of success is
the degree to which Western liberalism has afforded the opportunity.
In terms of Nietzsche’s ethical theory, Fukuyama’s beliefs that access to consumer culture
signals the victory of Western liberalism in its essential form seem to be prima facie justified. For
one, valuing the material goods produced by consumer culture clearly present opportunities for
encountering and overcoming resistance. One need look no further than various instances citing
the traditional American ideal that with enough hard work and dedication, someone with nothing
can make something out of themselves in the land of opportunity. Furthermore, there seems to be
no reason why valuing access to consumer culture should not be valued; in fact, both the nature of
the Western liberal economy and innovation almost certainly dictate that one continually purchase
items in order to keep the system afloat. Lastly, when seen through the perspective of Western
liberalism, it is quite clear that access to consumer culture does not interfere with the will to power.
In fact, in a society that values consumer goods, it seems justified to claim that the higher the level
of access to consumer goods an individual has, the higher level of power they have.
When further inspected, however, Fukuyama’s values do not completely conform to
Nietzsche’s criteria. For one, as alluded to earlier, Katsafanas’ constitutivism mandates that the
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prerequisites implemented upon an individual by a belief structure aiming for normative value
must be psychologically grounded on their facticity and psychological makeup. That is, not only
must the others in question have the infrastructure and support necessary to overcome resistances
prohibiting them from benefiting from the access to consumer culture, it must be a resistance that
is within their means to be overcome, or else risk being unsatisfied. Ideally, while this is an
attainable goal for some, it is not readily available for all.
Take for example the hypothetical individuals Jose and Maria, who serve the role of
DeParle’s concern for individuals from affluent families having a better opportunity than those
from less advantaged background. In this instance, Jose comes from an affluent home owning
family that, through trust funds, college funds, and parental presence, were able to secure a stable
future for their son, who ultimately was able to attend an ivy league university. Maria, on the other
hand, was born to a single mother who works two jobs and rents an apartment in a crime riddled
neighborhood and, despite the fact that she was able to attend a state college, had to rely on student
loans to graduate.
After graduating college, both Maria and Jose returned home with their parents to begin
their respective careers. While both individuals were afforded similar opportunities, intuition
dictates that Jose already has a leg up on Maria in the sense that he has a secure foundation from
which to build upon. Thanks to his parents’ hard work, Jose does not have to worry about student
loans, a mortgage, or any other mandate that is a byproduct of Western liberalism. Conversely,
while Maria was at least able to move her mother out of her previous neighborhood, she still has to
worry about paying rent, paying student loans, and various other expenses inherent in Western
liberalism.
While it is not entirely impossible that Maria pay off her student loans and attain a higher
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level of upward mobility, amongst other things, as has been shown, this is no longer as readily
available as it used to be. So while Jose is able to continue partaking in the privileges afforded by a
higher level of access to consumer goods, Maria is stuck floundering to get by. Furthermore, in
continuing our example, we find that Maria is clearly attempting to partake in Western liberalism.
Given her throwcity, however, it seems evident that she may never be able to achieve the same
level of power as Jose.
Lastly, the sheer efficacy of material goods as valuable can be called into question through
the will to power. While it is easy for some to say that “diverse contents” such as color televisions
and rock music are hallmarks of the triumph of Western liberalisms success, these values can
easily be inverted. That is, to say access to consumer culture is the hallmark of Western liberalism
is a rather objective claim. Others, who may be less inclined to material goods, would argue things
such as actual freedom, actual liberty, and actual equality, amongst others, are a better
indicator.136 As such, it is clear that Western liberalism, contrary to Fukuyama’s assertion, can in
fact still be expanded upon, explicitly by simply coalescing with the examples alluded to above,
and perhaps more difficultly by providing a system which makes it easier for people to establish
themselves, and thus truly enjoy the benefits of Western liberalism.
Furthermore, as Katsafanas’ reading of Nietzsche dictates, happiness is not an experiential
state. As per Katsafanas, material goods afforded by consumer culture are simply objects of a
drives; temporary goals that are the expression of drives. Conversely, an aim manifests drives in a
distinctive form of activity. As has been shown, drives aim at expression, and are not satisfied by
the attainment of any one determinate object. Instead, drives aim at the continuous attainment of
objects and overcoming of resistances. Using Katsafanas’ example, there seems to be nothing
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particularly important about running a predetermined amount of miles, yet for the marathon
runner, the reward is in the actual process of overcoming the resistance intrinsic to running
twenty-six miles.137
In Fukuyama’s defense, it could argued that continuously buying into the ever evolving
innovations afforded by Western liberalism, and putting forth the amount of work necessary to
afford them, could in itself be considered both the aim and the drive of an individual inclined to
consumer goods, with the purchasing of new objects being the expression of both. Whereas the
marathon runner enjoys the overcoming of resistance by manifesting their will to power through
endurance running, the consumer gains pleasure in the state achieved when hours of hard work and
dedication manifest themselves in the form of a new color television.
The problem with this interpretation, however, is that it falls victim to yet another
empirically sound psychological principle of the hedonic treadmill, which holds that both good
and bad events only temporarily affect happiness, with individuals quickly reverting to hedonic
neutrality.138 In Hedonic Relativism and Planning the Good Society, Philip Brickman and D.T.
Campbell posit that happiness and unhappiness are short-lived reactions to changes in people’s
circumstances, and that people continue to pursue happiness because they falsely believe that a
greater form of happiness is lying in wait. That said, while one ideally would experience a state of
happiness when buying into varying mandates of Western liberalism, as has been shown, this
happiness, unlike that prescribed by Nietzsche, is ephemeral at best.
Furthermore, this interpretation would also be running afoul of Katsafanas’ reading of
Nietzsche’s view, which holds that intellectual, artistic, and creative endeavors are to be valued
above all. As previously alluded to, this critique is best elucidated by Arendt, who believes the
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highest form of freedom is the ability to insert oneself into the world through both speech and
action. That is, it is not much the ability to simply buy into Western liberalism that is of
importance, but rather to do so through a means that empowers the individual to express their
subjective uniqueness, as opposed to having to labor for the given product. While it can be argued
that Western liberalism fosters the environment through which a successful artist, who is in high
demand, can in fact manage to buy into Western liberalism with the means afforded by their
artistic ventures, but such a scenario would certainly be the exception, not the rule. What is needed,
then, is an expanded form of Western liberalism that allows all individuals who desire to
contribute in ways other than labor and work, regardless of their level of success, to buy in to the
luxuries afforded by Western liberalism.
4.8

I’m Relying on Your Common Decency: So Far It Hasn’t Surfaced, But I’m Sure it
Exists
In returning to Wyschogrod, we find her asking the question of whether it is possible to

shape a community of shared experience in the wake of the cataclysm.139 Furthermore,
Wyschogrod asks what role the heterological historian plays in refiguring social existence always
already disfigured by the cataclysm. Wyschogrod notes that the role of the heterological historian
can only come to light as they react and respond to conflicting conceptions of communal life and
situates [themselves] in dynamic relationship to them.140
For Wyschogrod, the context of this enquiry is formulated around the framework of both
classical and contemporary views of community. Specifically, Wyschogrod names the
autochthony of Plato, which holds that communal bonds are strongest when engendered by
emergence from common soil, and modern accounts which are grounded in relations of production
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and exchange, noting that both of these forms follow a structure of immanence. Contrarily,
Wyschogrod asks if the heterological historian can formulate a community predicated on the
existence of an incommensurable outside that is neither a rhetorical convention of transcendence
nor ecstasy. That is, Wyschogrod is concerned with whether a community which transcends and
fissures the immanent models of community presented above can ever be formed post-cataclysm,
a community that does not strive to poeticize the past, nor offer an ethereal promise of fraternity.
141

In order to establish this notion of community, Wyschogrod employs Jean Paul Sartre’s
views on totalization, which, following the model of modernity discussed above, holds that the
establishment of a phenomenological community is contingent upon the formation of a common
consciousness of its members. As Wyschogrod-reading-Sartre notes, Sartre, in response to the
French Revolution, envisioned a collective group of individuals unknowingly united in a common
telos.
As Wyschogrod posits, however, the eventual drawback in Sartre’s view is both the
inevitable ossification once the original passions that created it have cooled, as well as remaining a
community based on production. Wyschogrod believes this model is unsuitable for the
heterological historian’s purpose. Rather, Wyschogrod affirms that a de-nucleation of the
self-coupled with a relation to exteriority is necessary for her vision of a heterological community
to come into being. As Wyschogrod notes, the link with exteriority inaugurates a community other
than that of production, the community of hospitality. As Wyschogrod notes, even in this
heterological community, production is inevitable. Wyschogrod asks, however, if there is not
some form of production that is gratuitous, workless, and resists ensnarement by the culture of
images? Furthermore, Wyschogrod likens this type of community to a piece of artwork, noting that
141
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value would originate in something other than labor.

142

Wyschogrod posits that this type of community would serve to offer a self-temporalized
future, manifested as hope, which would serve as a gift that individuals with no-thing in common
could offer one another. In light of the cataclysm, however, Wyschogrod notes that hope must be
re-evaluated so as not to serve as a mockery of that which cannot be spoken. Wyschogrod notes
that this radical rethinking of hope requires a reasonable expectation of happiness, in the manner
of either eudemonistic ethics or political utopian philosophy. Furthermore, Wyschogrod affirms
that this gift be assessed in terms of it gratuitousness on the one hand, and its inevitable
involvement in the sphere of economy on the other.143
In order to solidify the efficacy of these claims, Wyschogrod begins by further analyzing
the two models of community previously established, beginning with autochthony. Wyschogrod
notes that, despite the overwhelming evidence of mass exodus from areas of mass killings and
severe economic hardships, the myth of humans being from the earth has not disappeared. Rather,
the notion of autochthony has only further served to establish proprietary claims that routinely
result in fierce local wars.144
Tracing its Platonic roots, Wyschogrod proceeds to note that, despite Plato and Aristotle’s
views on the State and community, the heterological historian can scant afford to incorporate
either. Wyschogrod shifts to Aristotle’s notion of friendship, claiming that despite the perceived
self-regarding nature of Aristotle’s formulation, friendship is predicated upon facilitating the good
life of the individual citizen. That is, Wyschogrod-reading-Aristotle maintains that friendship
recurs to that which is good in relation to oneself; wanting to be who one is, being in harmony with
oneself, concentration of soul, and consistency in choosing pleasures and pains. Wyschogrod notes
142
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that these qualities, which enable one to do what is best for oneself, should also be wished for and
fostered in the friend who is a version of oneself.145
Wyschogrod notes, however, that for Aristotle, the meaning of friendship differs from the
traditional Greek meaning of an attraction between two human beings. Rather, Wyschogrod
affirms that for Aristotle, the definition of friendship is a community of love, and as a result, that it
is better to give love than to receive it. For Wyschogrod, this signifies a break in the self-serving
thrust of Aristotle’s views on eudemonia. That is, rather than aiming solely for their own
happiness, Wyschogrod-reading-Aristotle posits that one should wish others well for the other’s
sake and for one’s own. For Wyschogrod, this is not a consequentialist outcome, but rather a
deontological one, where good is done simply for its own sake, not for benefit.146
However, the issues remains for Wyschogrod that production is in humanity’s essence.
Wyschogrod notes that in the modern overturning of classical views on community, production
took hold as the foundation of community. Citing Jean-Luc Nancy, Wyschogrod affirms that,
despite the hope for a community free of class division, the very notion of human’s as producers
caused Marxism to founder, for inevitably, they would continue to fall victim to “tecnhopolitical”
domination.147 Wyschogrod notes that while this formulation of community was modified to
include humanity as an essence, it still fell victim to what Nancy referred to as an essence that
circulates as “economic, political, and technological production within a locked totality, and
‘immanent’ without essence that is ‘the general horizon of our time.’”148
In response, Wyschogrod introduces a Sartrian interpretation of community, which argues
that the mode of production is basic to the determination of social structure, and the only reason
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social fragmentation and alienated atomized individuals ever took hold in the first place was
because of a reaction to a post-Stalinist communist and capitalist world immediately following
World War II. For Wyschogrod-reading-Sartre, this was only made possible due to the lack of
access both culture and society had to the information culture.149
In that respect, Wyschogrod notes that for Sartre, the community is a byproduct of
totalization, what she affirms as the open-ended process of human life as it is lived historically.
Wyschogrod notes that Sartre distinguished between totality and totalization, the former simply
being a heuristic tool that acts both as an individual piece, distinct from the sum of parts, as well as
a self-relation determined by its relationship of its parts among itself. Furthermore, Wyschogrod
notes that each individual embodies the totality in a kind of macrocosmic-microcosmic
parallelism. In other words, for Sartre, the individuals functions in relation to the universal as both
part and whole, the relationship of which is predicated upon a reliance of one upon the other.150
For Wyschogrod, this serves as a critique of dialectical reason that could only have arisen
out of a post-Hegelian post-Stalinist world; a critique of an internalized and chronic alienation.
Wyschogrod, citing Sartre, states that
[The individual’s] free activity in its freedom, will take upon everything that crushes him
- exhausting work, exploitation, oppression, and rising prices… His liberty is the means
chosen by the Thing and by the Other to crush him and to transform him into a worked
Thing.151
Wyschogrod notes that, despite its bleakness, Sartre’s insight offers a sliver of hope, for through
totalization enters the wedge into the creation of community. Citing Sartre, Wyschogrod declares
that only now can we have critique in its etymological sense as that which can “set limits to the
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scope of totalizing activities in order to restore to them their validity.”152
Essentially, this setting of limits is tantamount to a reevaluation of the traditionally held
values of a post-World War II society. Wyschogrod notes that, despite its perceived drawbacks,
need plays an important role in this process, as it serves as a means by which the “indigence of the
tout autre opens out into production.”153 Wyschogrod claims that, according to Sartre,
“Everything is to be explained through need.”154 Rather than a desire for material goods,
however, Sartre’s need is read more in lines of the will to power, where “In its most primal form,
need is the indigence of an organism, hunger, and its relief.”155 As per Wyschogrod’s reading of
Sartre, need is the “natural” grounding for that which is most fundamental to social existence,
economic scarcity.156
Wyschogrod posits that, rather than a static state, scarcity is dynamic relation between
human beings and the environment, and that human labor serves to satisfy needs in a material field
of scarcity. Wyschogrod believes that it is scarcity, as dictated by historical events, that is
inherently responsible for the sense that the other is a threat, thus making violence possible. This
insight, Wyschogrod asserts, is key to Sartre’s belief that the transformation of one economic and
political life is necessary to ensure the end of violence created by socially or naturally created
scarcities.
For Sartre, this is overcome by the merging of a common consciousness, one which fills the
void created by the unorganized collectivity of individuals which “makes itself into a community
by feeling individual need as a common need, and by projecting itself… towards objectives that it
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produces in common.”

157

In order to demonstrate the efficacy of this example,

Wyschogrod-reading-Sartre claims that this cohesion of community and common consciousness
was personified during the French Revolution. Wyschogrod claims that after being deceived about
their expected cache of arms, the city of Paris became a group fusion united in the common
purpose of storming The Bastille. Wyschogrod, citing Joseph Catalano, notes that the structure of
the group is best demonstrated by the view that “Each person approaching the group is not an
individual other joining the group as a common other. Rather, each person is related to every other
through the group itself. Of course, such a belief has its drawbacks, namely mob mentality and
fascism, but the heterological historian must be aware this potential in order to avoid it, as dictated
by Wyschogrod.
As per Wyschogrod’s reading of Sartre, this is only possible if the overcoming of
reciprocal alienation and objectification that appears inherent in social existence is overcome “so
that when I see the other, I see my own lived objectively.”158 Wyschogrod notes that in order for
this cohesion to remain intact, this common consciousness must harden its identity in an effort to
prevent fragmentation once its objectives are reached.159 In doing so, the group dedicates itself to
preserving its being, which in turn serves the very ends that the group had been formed to
combat.160 As Sartre notes, “The third party is my objectivity interiorized. I do not see it in him as
Other but mine.”161
In response, Wyschogrod asks what is to be made of a community that is not united in
common purpose. Specifically, Wyschogrod traces her argument from the notion of community as
shared proprietary interests, noting that proprietary refers to that which is one’s own, what belongs
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to the individual. Wyschogrod asserts that this view lays the foundation for the logic of modern
community. Wyschogrod claims, however that after exploring derivative forms, it is possible to
figure production so that it is no longer configured as work. Specifically, Wyschogrod contends
that calculative communities, predicated on the circulation of goods and their symbolic
equivalents, is invested in living within the self-enclosed circuitry of information and spectacle.162
In that respect, Wyschogrod claims that a precursor for such a community is that joy
demands freedom and that, in the context of social existence, such freedom is expressed in terms of
rights. Unlike Fukuyama, who thinks the freedom inherent in Western liberalism is measured by
access to consumer culture, Wyschogrod notes that this view of freedom takes into account
different desires among individuals, desires which are at the same time constrained by the
responsibility to others. Therefore, as alluded to previously, the aim is not to limit the amount of
access one has to consumer culture, but rather to provide the means by which all individuals have
similar access to all facets of consumer culture. In doing so, one is given not only the freedom to
fulfill their basic needs, but also the opportunity to remain outside of the production process
through that which resist disclosure, artwork.163
4.9

Don’t Stop Thinking About Tomorrow: Don’t Stop, It’ll Soon be Here
Wyschogrod posits that in order for such a community to come into being, it is necessary to

welcome the other by abandoning any pre-established hostilities. Wyschogrod affirms that, if
hospitality and artwork are to serve as the non-ground of communal existence, the heterological
historian’s creation of the ancient artifact must figure in the development of the community. That
is, the heterological historian must consider the time scheme of the community of hospitality,
namely that, in its exteriority, eludes presence. Likewise, Wyschogrod posits, “a community of
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pre-originary production, that of artwork, does not re-present a given form, but rather dis-figures
presence”.164 That said, something must be added that will take into account the present struggle.
For Wyschogrod, this is answered through the gift of community. Through community,
one is given the gifts of both the future and a fraternal bond. Furthermore, community offers the
gift of time, specifically that of the future. Wyschogrod asserts that if this future is to be a gift in the
traditional sense, then it cannot be a future of despair, only that of hope. Wyschogrod posits that
the heterological historian must be aware that such a gift of hope could serve to aestheticize the
plight of the others. Particularly, Wyschogrod notes that such a gift of future hope can be neither
one of utopia nor oblivion. Rather, hope should serve as a beacon for a future that is always yet to
come but may never arrive. Wyschogrod contends that in order to remain hope, hope must desire
the possible.165
4.10

Give Away The Stone: Let The Waters Kiss and Transmutate These Leaden
Grudges Into Gold
As has been show, through Wyschogrod’s reading of Sartre, we are afforded a new take on

community, one which, if validated, would serve to undermine Fukuyama’s notion that history has
come to an end. Specifically, if Wyschogrod is correct, and Western liberalism in its current state
can in fact still be expanded upon, then Fukuyama’s contrary claim will have been definitively
proven false. Following the predefined mandates of constitutivism, it is crucial for the
heterological historian to establish the efficacy of this claim once and for all. Specifically, through
Katsafanas’s reading of Nietzsche’s will to power, we find the instability of Fukuyama’s analysis
rests on the basis that, in living under the mandates of his version of Western liberalism, the will to
power of marginalized individuals is constricted. That is, unlike those on the winning side of
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Fukuyama’s victory march, the voiceless others have certain possibility structures removed from
their horizon of possibilities simply by virtue of having to satisfy lower levels of Maslow’s
hierarchy of needs before they can ever embark on the path towards self-fulfillment. Much like the
above mentioned early settlers of El Paso, the current others find themselves having to labor just to
be able to support themselves, and as a result, are unable to pursue means of self-actualization.
Most importantly, however, given the trend of stifled upward mobility, this is a situation
which may in fact be more difficult to rise out of than before, thus directly running afoul of
Katsafanas’ pre-established mandate dictating that the line between boredom and anxiety is
delineated by one’s ability to actually act. Rather than facilitate an environment in which all
individuals are free to develop their own subjective authentic choices that emerge from their own
personal will to power, Fukuyama’s approach perpetuates a top-down hierarchically imposed
political system that perpetuates the kinds of inequalities and ethical omissions referred to
throughout my thesis.
In that respect, Katsafanas’ Nietzschean constitutivism, coupled with Wyschogrod’s
heterological historian, allow me to establish the efficacy of Wyschogrod’s views on a future
oriented community predicated of hope and promise. Never mind the striking similarities shared
by both Katsafanas’ reading of Nietzsche and Wyschogrod’s reading of Sartre. For our purposes
sake, we need only focus on running Wyschogrod’s views on community through the lens of
Katsafanas’ reading of Nietzsche, as was done with Fukuyama. Starting with Katsafanas’ reading
of Nietzsche, we are reminded that to make a value claim is simply to state an object of valuing. In
this instance, Wyschogrod is valuing the promise afforded by the future. In terms of Nietzsche’s
ethical theory, Wyschogrod’s beliefs that the promise of the future as a means by which to
establish a non-exploitative community of common consciousness seems to be justified. For one,
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an open ended promise for the future clearly present opportunities for encountering and
overcoming resistance; one would need look no further than the various attempts made for peace in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip to see this. Furthermore, there seems to be no reason why valuing a
future oriented community should not be valued. Operating under the pretense of coexistence, one
would seem inclined to desire a state of tranquility. More importantly, the emergence of a perfect
state is essentially what is dictated by Hegel’s conception of Spirit’s Absolute. Lastly, when seen
through the perspective of a common consciousness, it is quite clear that a future oriented
community does not interfere with the will to power. In fact, in a time where the subjugation of
many individuals the world over is currently in effect, it would appear that a future oriented
community feeds straight into the mandates of the will to power.
When further inspected, Wyschogrod’s values also do not seem to run afoul of Nietzsche’s
criteria. For one, as alluded to earlier, Katsafanas’ constitutivism mandates that the prerequisites
implemented upon an individual by a belief structure aiming for normative value must be
psychologically grounded on their facticity and psychological makeup. This is not a problem for
Wyschogrod, who is readily admitting that the goal of a future oriented community is to offer
relief to those who are not in a position to attain higher levels of expression. Furthermore,
Wyschogrod, like Katsafanas, contends that an individual has reason to pursue those activities that
afford difficulties that can be overcome, but not so difficult that they cannot be overcome, further
falling in line with Nietzsche’s criteria.
Additionally, as Katsafanas’ reading of Nietzsche dictates, happiness is not an experiential
state. This falls perfectly in line with Wyschogrod, who readily admits that this future oriented
community is subject to constantly shifting temporalities. Moreover, unlike Fukuyama,
Wyschogrod’s views do not conflict with the will to power. In establishing a concrete end point to
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history, Fukuyama is essentially shutting the door on any further progress that can be made. As has
been shown, however, to remain in a state of stasis is not the nature of neither Spirit nor the will to
power. This is not an issue for Wyschogrod, who freely admits that this future oriented community
may or may not ever come to fruition, and as such, is constantly subject to expansion.
Most importantly, as per Katsafanas’ above mentioned clarification on Nietzsche’s views
one will to power, one is morally required to take up, amongst other things, artistic creation. In that
regard, Wyschogrod’s view is ever more attractive, for having established her updated views on
production, Wyschogrod claims that it is incumbent upon the future oriented community to foster a
state in which artistic expression is mandatory, particularly one which, like Felipe Coronel, is
predicated off helping bring attention and relief to the plight of the others.
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Chapter 5: Now I Could Let These Dream Killers Kill my Self-esteem, or Use
my Arrogance as The Steam to Power my Dreams
5.1 Resistance is Fertile
Unlike Fukuyama, I claim that we are merely in a transition from one historical epoch to
another historical epoch that is coming to an end via the information culture provided by the
Internet. What follows once the Absolute end of history is reached, if ever, is subject to infinitely
many assumptions. What demands our attention, however is that, given the information available
demonstrating the continued subjugation of the voiceless others, it seems clear that Spirit has not
yet reached its Absolute form. To argue otherwise, as Fukuyama has, is simply a form of cultural
hegemony, for in an age where drone strikes on innocent civilians is commonplace, to say that
history has come to an end is unacceptable.166 Rather than ethically progress to a point where we
have come to understand that harming others either physically or socio-economically, whether
intentionally or by indifference, is morally unjustified, we find ourselves at a punctiform moment
in time where we can freely admit to ourselves that historical actions such as burning women at the
stake for witchcraft in the 17th century was a morally reprehensible act, but burning innocent
civilians in the Middle East with white phosphorous for their associations with unacceptable
political groups remains the norm.167
When we attempt to analyze history in metaphysical terms, we find ourselves speculating
about Absolutes and other difficult conceptualizations. In over 4,000 years of philosophizing, we
still find ourselves with a lack of consensus in regards to what should and should not be universally
accepted in terms of our social relations. As Wyschogrod notes, however, even such general
consensus would not be enough:
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The discursive space of authorization presupposed by theoretical accounts of justice is
not a claim about what is intrinsically good, or an assessment of the good in terms of the
consequences of actions, but simply the realization that there is another and that the
other’s existence obliges me to disown what is mine, to divest myself of myself and
accept responsibility for the other.168
The presupposition Wyschogrod refers to is that there is an underlying truth about which we all
should agree, and that is that, unlike Fukuyama’s assertion, there is a group of others who in fact
exist and that they have been marginalized for far long enough. As I discussed in previous
chapters, the absence of the others who cannot speak for themselves mandates a moral
responsibility for the heterological historian, dictated by the principle of humanity, to ensure that
the conditions are satisfied that would allow the once-marginalized others to move beyond the
lowest levels of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Even if we may never see their faces in person,
Wyschogrod asserts that giving countenance to these others is a task we must all embrace, for in a
future-oriented community, the only thing individuals with no-thing in common have to offer to
ensure their survival is hope for an uncertain future. We need to begin by working now to mitigate
the material uncertainty.
But not only do most people seem indifferent to Wyschogrod’s proposition, some, like
Fukuyama, seem content promoting the exact opposite. As Wyschogrod notes, the evidence for
this indifference to the needs of the most marginalized or disenfranchised people is most readily
seen in the mass extermination of peoples in recent history. While Wyschogrod grants that war and
mass death are nothing new in the annals of human history, she posits that the new guise which it
has assumed is most troubling. Rather than the traditional character of mass destruction,
Wyschogrod is wary of the inverse-utilitarianism created by the bureaucratic and technological
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military industrial complex that is now employed to ensure the annihilation of the most amount of
people in the least amount of time. The pitfalls of the supposed “victory of Western liberalism”
that Fukuyama proclaims are most readily seen in contemporary American society, where we have
made questionable humanitarian progress. That is, even with all the technology that has enabled us
to feed, clothe, shelter, and heal on mass levels, we shockingly still have people who believe that it
is wrong to feed the hungry, clothe and shelter the homeless, and care for the infirm. For example,
according to Feeding America, one in six Americans goes hungry every day.169
Wyschogrod argues that this is a systematic process that keeps others suppressed which,
for my thesis, happens both intentionally and unintentionally. For someone like Fukuyama, I
maintain that this disregard for others is intentional. But unlike previous Cataclysms that happened
to groups of people living in particular regions, the active suppression of others can result
“unintentionally” in mass death on a global scale. In other words, the current “genocide” of
marginalized others is not intentionally limited to a particular culture, but rather permeates the
whole rest of the world that is left out of the privileging of Spirit’s unveiling. “This privileging” is
an equal opportunity discriminator that strikes any and every person it can without regard to age,
sex, race, creed, et cetera; all that one has to do to qualify is to have the bad luck to be born into
marginalized conditions in any given locale on earth—to be unintentionally unprivileged. And
without the conscious realization that an immaterial change is necessary to bring about actual
change, and the concerted effort by the heterological historian to manifest such an immaterial
change in a timely manner, this continued material injustice will simply be allowed to perpetuate.
What we need, therefore, is to radically and critically engage in the realm of consciousness, what I
have been calling the realm of Spirit, if we want to challenge the Victory March of neo-liberal
Western Capitalism.
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As I have shown in my thesis, I identify this sort of active engagement with the
philosophies of Nietzsche and Hegel and how that occurs by way of re-evaluating the values of the
dialectical evolution of consciousness in how that takes shape via the material forces of history.
The only way the continued marginalization of the others will ever come to an end is by
heterological historians, operating with a new conscious awareness, manipulating the information
culture in such a way that enables a Wyschogrodian ethics of understanding to permeate into the
realm of consciousness, in the hope that the Spirit of this generation simply will no longer tolerate
the systematic neglect of the others.170 This can only be done by giving the traditionally repressed
others a voice that enables them to combat the historically domineering narrative that has
marginalized them with the telling of their own story through their own words.
With the emergence of technology, particularly the Internet and Internet-ready devices, the
ability for any and every person to have a voice has never been more readily available. This act of
empowerment enables the once voiceless others to dictate their own subjective narrative, as
opposed to having it told by someone else, and is made possible only through technology. As
Wyschogrod-reading-Heidegger notes, technology should be seen less instrumentally and more of
a means for revealing truth.171 Citing the philological roots of the ancient Greek work tecnhe,
Wyschogrod posits that technology has at its foundation both the making of things and works of art
as well as a knowing that implies expertise and understanding. As a result, Wyschogrod affirms
that through technology, modernity reveals truth. From Wyschogrod’s reading of Heidegger, we
better understand the duality of the epistemic grounding for knowing that is codependent upon
both our ability to grasp technology as a powerful and power-generating means of production and
our ability to understand how technology provides us with the means by which modernity is
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revealed and makes itself evident to the knower. That is, while Wyschogrod’s reading of
Heidegger admits that it is necessary for one to know the means by which the technology comes
about and is applied, technology also plays a deterministic force in revealing itself and its role in
modernity to those who seek it.
Accordingly, Wyschogrod notes that this act of revealing is driven by a latent destiny that
propels the parousia inherent in the human-technology dichotomy of progress. As Wyschogrod
contends, “To be sure, it is human beings who drive technology, but it is the essence of technology
as a manner of revealing truth that drives them.”172 Continuing with Heidegger’s critique,
Wyschogrod notes that the traditional historian is thus limited by the confines of technology,
confines which mandate that history be revealed as a mere recording and not a revealing. In
returning to the difficulty of bringing to the fore that which has already passed, Wyschogrod
affirms that the cataclysm, as “recorded” by the traditional historian, always takes place after
having already taken place; that is, we are stuck with simple repetitions of one externally fixed
perspective. Working from the ineffability of speech afforded by the paradox of unsayability, the
historian is faced with the following problem; how can one speak of that which cannot be said?
That is, how does one or how can one relate to a particular experience from an outsiders
perspective?
Applying the work of Wyschogrod’s heterological historian, however, may help solve this
paradox, for it is the essence of an image to speak without muttering a word. That is, unlike
Fukuyama, who in failing to satisfy Hegel’s critiques of historiography by externally imposing his
neo-liberal interpretation upon his analyses of Western liberalism’s supposed manifestation as
Hegel’s Absolute Spirit or State, the heterological historian is able to embrace the information
culture in a way that lets the narratives of the many others speak for themselves.
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The defining characteristic of the information culture is the increased connectivity that the
Internet provides. However, the heterological historian—whose perspectives are ethically
informed—is also well aware of the fact that technological devices, whose essence provides both
the foundation of and access to the information culture, require conflict minerals in order for such
devices to be created in the first place and to reveal the very information they provide. Therefore,
the inherent contradiction that constitutes these devices directs awareness towards the
marginalization of the very people who are mining the minerals used to create them in the first
place is central to my thesis, and is that which I am calling the parousia that is inherent in Spirit’s
unveiling and that reveals the suffering of those initially left out of Spirit’s unveiling to itself. It
would appear, then, that the suffering of the Congolese and other voiceless others is not in vain,
since their narrative can in fact be redeemed after all.
From the subjugation of the others, technology was given the conflict minerals necessary
to manifest itself in ways such as computers and the Internet, which in turn, allowed these devices
to give rise to the information culture. And much the same as the young El Pasoans who had
satisfied the basic tenets of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs were able to take advantage of the
growing economy by taking part and contributing to its development, individuals the world over
who have also satisfied Maslow’s hierarchy of needs can embrace the connectivity provided by the
Internet and employ it as future directed, community oriented heterological historians. In doing so,
they would also help those who are yet to satisfy Maslow’s hierarchy improve their conditions,
with the hopes that one day those who were once marginalized will be able to live authentic lives
of self-actualization.
The urgency of the task of the heterological historian is accentuated when applying Hegel’s
views that the realm of consciousness affects the material realm. By making a concerted effort to
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apply the principles of empathy and compassion, the heterological historian can manipulate the
information culture in such a way that exposes the world to the suffering of innocent people, and as
a result, brings their condition to the attention of the collective oculus. In the previous epoch, such
information was confined to dusty bookshelves of libraries that may or may not have been
available, but with the transformation of the world and our cultural relations through technology,
information is now ready-at-hand to anyone with Internet accessibility. Despite this increased
connectivity, a renewed sense of exigency is placed on the ethical mandates of heterological
historians, as they must be further driven by the need to speak for the billions of marginalized
people in the world who either do not have Internet connectivity or adequate access to technology,
until the time inevitably comes when such technology will be readily available to all of Dasein.
This idea is central my thesis, for it is the responsibility of heterological historians to elevate all
marginalized individuals who have been rendered voiceless to a position where they are able to
insert themselves into the world on their own.
As alluded to earlier, Wyschogrod’s method is informed by the Communist Manifesto’s
inversion of Hegel’s dialectic, and as a result, it is imperative that heterological historians
acknowledge their responsibility to the others and seize Spirit’s unveiling by manipulating the
information culture in such a way that brings an end to the others marginalization, rather than stand
passively by and let Spirit play itself out in the process of self-reflexive unveiling. Ideally, this
would solve the omissions that happen through the critical negations of Hegel’s historical
dialectic, and its distorted appropriation by Hegelians like Fukuyama, by coalescing those who
were outside of Spirit into the essence of Spirit itself. This coalescing move then would enable
Spirit to continue on its quest for self-actualization as its Absolute self.
Of course, this cannot be done given Fukuyama’s model, for essentially, if history had in
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fact ended with the fall of The Berlin Wall, Sprit would have remained in constant negation. If we
remain faithful to the vision of Hegel’s logic, however, remaining in negation is a logical fallacy,
since the core tenet of the progression of Spirit is that it continues to change. And inherent in
change is the binarism of decline and rebirth, namely, life leading to death and death leading to
life. That metaphysics entails that Spirit embarks upon a journey of constant death and renewal in
which it continuously obliterates itself in the hope of arising anew. That means that not only is
Spirit open to an unknown future but Spirit is also made stronger and more stable than before via
its dialectical process of the laborious work of history to build its own pyre in which to immolate
itself, only to arise as a Phoenix in ever-new glorious reincarnations.
But for us, Spirit can be said to have evolved to a point where it has realized in its many
incarnations that the path it has trodden thus far, one that has repeatedly resulted in the subjugation
of the others, is simply not working. In doing so, it has unveiled a portion of the parousia that we,
the future subjects of history, experience as a hidden awakening and that allows us to harness the
cunning of reason and put it to work in a manner that does not involve slaughter benches nor
subjugation. If Spirit is truly a self-reflective process of becoming, then I believe Wyschogrod is
correct in claiming that history is coming to an end via the technological transformations that
enable us to re-imagine ourselves differently, through an ethical manipulation of the very images
provided by this transformative technological process.
Having realized that a change in social patterns is necessary in order to escape the current
state of political and cultural oppression, the passions of Individuals have manifested themselves
into modern technology, which in turn has lead us to our current information culture. In a move of
self-affirmation, images can be said to be a death and a rebirth in the sense that technology has
simultaneously put an end to the dead other’s inability to voice the pain of their own personal
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cataclysm, and ipso facto, given birth to the ability for their story to be told via the image-centrism
of contemporary information culture. No longer “voiceless” the narratives of the dead others has
blurred the line between being and reality.
In turn, this blurring of boundaries has made way for skepticism to enter into the
heterological historian’s arsenal, giving them a means of saying that which previously could not be
said. Most importantly, skepsis allows us, the future subjects of history, to manipulate our
consciousness in a way that allows us to recognize and rectify the obstacles facing Spirit. As stated
by Heidegger, “[skepsis] renders the spirit for the first time competent to examine what the truth is,
for it brings about a state of despair about all of the so-called natural ideas, thoughts and opinions
which obstruct Spirit’s progress.”173 Because of this, we are no longer able to carry on with
“business as usual”, for our history of advancing through the slaughter-bench of oppression at the
expense of the others is itself becoming history. The heterological historian is called to action
under the precept that they no longer have an excuse to allow the pervading thought process
manifest itself in such a marginalizing manner like it did in the past. Unlike before, the
heterological historian has available to them a plethora of images giving birth to a new
consciousness that will no longer tolerate death and destruction, one that embraces Spirit’s
manifestation as technology and employs it in a constructive manner.
What we have witnessed in the rise of images is the birth of a punctiform moment in time
that forces us to become aware of what previously could not be said. We partake in the experience
of what we are witnessing, and as such, take the form of the image upon ourselves to materialize
the effects an image may have on us as we may. In viewing a photograph, we are placed in a
position of power, for as Wyschogrod states, “to watch is to control, and to be watched is to be
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powerless.”174 In that respect, it is incumbent upon us, the viewer, to take action for those who are
not in a position to do so. In doing so, we inherently would be influenced by means that at one
point did not exist, namely the voice of the dead others. In giving voice to these others, the
heterological historian is also giving faciality to the dead others, a move that enables them to do
posthumously what they were not able to do while enmeshed in the grips of the cataclysm—to
insert themselves into the world. Furthermore, as beneficiaries of the principle of humanity, those
who are given their voice are thereby also given the ability to create their own works of art that
reflect their own subjective experience, as opposed to having to rely on individuals who do not
share in their experience do it for them. Given the mandates of Hegel’s dialectic, once the thoughts
of the others enter into the realm of consciousness, it has already satisfied the preliminary
measures necessary to manifest the eventual change in the physical realm that will directly lead to
an improvement of material conditions. Therefore, in satisfying Nietzsche’s criteria of engaging in
the arts, the pursuit of self-understanding, and the suffering necessary to achieve one’s goals, we
find that the others also set Nietzsche’s revolution—with its evaluation of values—in motion. That
is, rather than attempt to manifest change in some form of physical rebellion, the others, like the
Jewish people in Nietzsche’s parable, combat the master narrative through an artistic effort that
can only be measured in terms of an ethical “spirituality”. In doing so, they fulfill Wyschogrod’s
desire of saying “This is as it was, and it should not have been so.”
None of this will be possible, however, if the conditions that foster such a possibility
structure are not first made available. Much the same as the original inhabitants of El Paso
employed labor and work in order to satisfy the basic levels of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, and
thus ensuring the structures that foster the pursuit of self-actualization, so to must the heterological
historian ensure the that the work is undertaken that will facilitate the establishment of
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Wyschogrod’s future oriented community.
As Wyschogrod notes, this is only achieved through giving up any pre-established
hostilities, as well as inverting the production paradigm to establish a non-exploitative means of
production. Much like Nietzsche, Wyschogrod believes this is best achieved through artistic
endeavors. Therefore, as a final expansion to Wyschogrod’s heterological historian, the onus to
insert themselves into the world through word and action is of utmost importance. Ideally, the
works of art would reflect a conscientious effort that actively intends to bring awareness to the
plight of the others, such as the case of the previously mentioned hip-hop artist Felipe Coronel.
The belief that one is driven by an ethics of understanding to insert themselves into the
world through Wyschogrod’s re-imagined views on production is crucial to my thesis. Given the
mandates of Western liberalism, however, I understand that asking for individuals to engage in
artistic endeavors directed towards shedding light on the plight of the others, for the sake of
establishing a future-oriented community predicated on the circulation of goods and their
symbolic equivalents, is not only a sizeable request to make, but a lofty ideal, as well. But given
the other option and what we have been made aware of, to blatantly reject such a request would be
an exercise in bad faith. Furthermore, while it is simple to personify Kant’s example and be that
person who, despite the fact they are able to contribute, chooses not to, the result, as has been
shown, is the continued marginalization of the others. If every action by a particular individual
truly does have an effect on the universal whole of humanity, then to be apathetic towards this
subjugation, especially after having been made aware of it, is to signal participation through tacit
consent.
As Nelson Mandela once said, “What counts in life is not the mere fact that we have lived.
It is what difference we have made to the lives of others that will determine the significance of the
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life we lead.”175 One’s actions are the ultimate intentionality that gives one’s life meaning, and not
only is one defined by their actions, but also by the purpose their actions serve Dasein. As alluded
to earlier, actions create a chain of network events, a progress through which worlds are created.
That said, action with the intent of avoiding marginalization would ideally ensure the
future-oriented community predicated off of hope and promise will be ready for when the others
do catch up. If that time comes, the future oriented-community gains the ability to move forward
into the next epoch of history. Of course, as Wyschogrod asserts, this idealistic future is always,
until its manifestation, nothing more than a promise.
And while it perhaps may in fact be a very idealistic promise to maintain, the heterological
historian can take comfort in the words of Marianne Williamson, who states that
Our deepest fear is not that we are inadequate. Our deepest fear is that we are powerful
beyond measure. It is our light, not our darkness, that frightens us. We ask ourselves,
‘Who am I to be brilliant, gorgeous, talented, fabulous?’ Actually, who are you not to
be? You are a child of God. Your playing small does not serve the world. There is
nothing enlightened about shrinking so that other people won’t feel insecure around
you… We are born to make manifest the glory of God that is within us. It’s not just
in some of us; it’s in everyone. And as we let our own light shine, we unconsciously give
other people permission to do the same. As we are liberated from our fear, our presence
automatically liberates others.176
While this future-oriented community may in fact be not only a lofty desire, but at the moment
nothing more than an empty intention, as has been show, it will only remain so if one consciously
choose to let it be so.
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Through Spirits manifestation as technology, the means to rectify the contradiction in
Hegel’s dialectic is made possible. By being empathetic to the relationship between all of Dasein,
the understanding that it is incumbent upon all Dasein to help save the others is necessary in order
to help usher Spirit into its next evolution as human history. This can only be done, as Wyschogrod
claims, through an ethics of understanding that serves to instill through art and action a future
oriented community predicated off hope and promise. As Wyschogrod notes, however, this must
be done before it is too late, as the only way to “distinguish the future from the past is [through]
future’s seemingly ubiquitous relation to possibility. As the present moves ahead, the multiple
possibilities of the future drop away; the future is lived as an annihilation of possibilities.”177
In light of what I have conveyed in my thesis, the heterological historian must understand
that the option to simply reflect on history after it has unveiled is no longer an option; for one must
actively partake in the manifestation of Spirit. In doing so, the heterological historian gives voice
to innumerable others who have been left out of Hegel’s Spirit, and instill in them the words of
Kenyan actress Lupita Nyong’o, who, upon winning an Academy Award, ended her impassioned
speech with an affirmation to all the others by stating “every little child… no matter where you are
from, your dreams are valid.”178 It is this mantra that the heterological historian embodies in hopes
of receiving the ultimate cosmic recognition, that is, a wink in the mirror of reflection
acknowledging all humans, regardless of their position in life, we were created to recognize that
which we were created from—the Absolute.
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December 1st, 1986. I am proud of my community and of the collective experiences we share with
others the world over who were thrown into similar circumstances. Experiences which were
marked by a noted struggle in attempting to keep up with the mandates of Western liberalism after
starting the race from far behind. Despite this, I refuse to make excuses for the conditions I found
myself thrown in to, which is why after graduating from Austin High School in 2005, I joined the
United States Coast Guard with the sole intent of receiving the Montgomery G.I. Bill and moving
up in the world through education. After receiving an honorable discharge in late 2008, I applied
the benefits I earned while in the service to pay for my education, attaining my bachelor’s degree
in philosophy from The University of Texas at Austin in three years, immediately followed by my
master’s degree in philosophy from The University of Texas El Paso in two years. Now, with my
degree in one hand and my thesis in the other, I plan on leaving the academic world to incite
change in the real world, a feat I intend to accomplish through words, both written and spoken. To
that extent, I consider December 1st, 2013 the day I consciously inserted myself into the world with
the release of my first hip-hop album, Here’s To Life, under my nom de guerre, Ice Nice.
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